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COPYRIGHT TRUST
Abraham Bell† & Gideon Parchomovsky ††
Collaborative production of expressive content accounts for an evergrowing number of copyrighted works. Indeed, in the age of content sharing
and peer production, collaborative efforts may have become the paradigmatic
form of authorship. Surprisingly, though, copyright law continues to view
the single-author model as the dominant model of peer production. Copyright law’s approach to authorship is currently based on a hodgepodge of
rigid doctrines that conflate ownership and control. The result is a binary
system under which a contributor to a collaborative work is either recognized
as an author with full control and management rights or a person who is
deemed a nonauthor with no rights whatsoever. We argue that the doctrines
and judicial precedents that govern the all-important issue of authorship are
out of step with authorial reality. And the cost to the copyright system is
enormous. As we show in this Article, the misalignment between copyright
law and authorial reality is both inefficient and unfair: it harms incentives
to create, it denies reward to contributors, it leads to underutilization of content, and it creates excessive litigation.
To remedy this state of affairs, we propose a new legal construct, which
we call “copyright trust.” In designing this new tool we draw on insights
from property and corporate theory—two areas of research that have long
dealt with the challenges of collaborative enterprises and coownerships. The
doctrine of copyright trust is predicated on the insight of decoupling ownership from control. Essentially, it would empower courts to appoint one contributor as an “owner-trustee” with full managerial rights and the exclusive
power to control the use of the work, while recognizing all other contributors
as “owner-beneficiaries,” who would be entitled to receive a certain percentage
of the proceeds from the work. Copyright trusts would enable courts to retain
the benefits of having a single owner without sacrificing the rightful claims
of other contributors who would be entitled to receive a just reward for their
efforts. The proposed doctrine of copyright trust would supplement, not replace, current doctrine. It is designed to enrich the menu of options available
to courts in deciding authorship issues. The addition of our solution to the
† Professor, Bar Ilan University Faculty of Law and University of San Diego School of
Law.
†† Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School and Bar Ilan University Faculty of
Law. This Article greatly benefited from comments and criticisms by Stefan Bechtold, Bob
Brauneis, Umberto Izzo, Rob Merges, Guy Rub, Andres Sawicki, and Roger Schechter, as
well as participants in workshops at the Bar Ilan University Faculty of Law and the Center
for Law & Economics at ETH, Zurich, the Law-Tech Seminar at the University of Trento
and the Twelfth Annual Works-in-Progress Intellectual Property Colloquium at the United
States Patent and Trademark Office. The authors are grateful to Ananth Padmanabhan
for excellent research assistance.

1015

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-5\CRN501.txt

1016

unknown

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

Seq: 2

12-JUN-15

12:29

[Vol. 100:1015

judicial toolbox would not only make it richer but would also infuse current
law with much-needed flexibility that is sorely missing from other authorship
doctrines.
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INTRODUCTION
The sole author is an important analytical benchmark for copyright law and policy.1 But in the real world, many copyright assets—
and perhaps the vast majority of the commercially valuable ones—
result from the efforts of more than one contributor. Indeed, in certain copyright domains, such as cinema, software, and games, all
works emanate from the labor of multiple individuals as a matter of
course. Dozens contribute to the making of a computer game. A
movie is made by hundreds, perhaps thousands. Yet the law has, to
1
See Lionel Bently, R. v The Author: From Death Penalty to Community Service, 32
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 17–18 (2008); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship, Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1206–07 (2000).
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date, found only imperfect formulas for allocating rights among contributors, despite numerous rulings2 and contributions by theorists.3
Disputes among collaborators in creative works are legion. Just
consider a few of the prominent recent cases involving ownership disputes among contributors to copyrighted works. In Garcia v. Google,
Inc.,4 an actress in a controversial movie about the life of Muhammad,
the founder of Islam, won a claim of separate ownership of her performance, thereby blocking distribution of the movie through popular outlets like YouTube.5 In Aalmuhammed v. Lee,6 the writer of
several pieces of dialogue and scenes in Spike Lee’s biographical film
about Malcolm X saw the court reject his claim of a share of ownership in the film.7 In Thomson v. Larson,8 the court rejected a dramaturg’s claim of joint authorship of the play “Rent” even though she
had worked face-to-face with the screenwriter in altering the story and
rewriting the script.9
2
See generally Janky v. Lake Cnty. Convention & Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356 (7th
Cir. 2009) (finding a joint copyright between composer and songwriter); Richlin v. MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Inc., 531 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming district court’s finding that plaintiffs did not have a copyright interest in the treatment rights that their ancestor assigned to the defendant motion picture company); Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d
1227 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that creative contributions did not suffice to establish
coauthorship); Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting
the collaboration alone test for copyright interests); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d
Cir. 1991) (affirming that joint authorship requires intent by the parties to establish
coauthorship copyright interests); Maxwood Music Ltd. v. Malakian, 713 F. Supp. 2d 327
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that reserving the right to make final decisions does not indicate
an intent to be a joint author); Ulloa v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 303 F.
Supp. 2d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (refusing to find copyright interest when there was no understanding between parties that song would be used, and thus no joint authorship).
3
Two excellent recent examples are Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthorship, 100 VA. L. REV. 1683 (2014) and Anthony J. Casey & Andres Sawicki, Copyright in
Teams, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683 (2013). Other works include Benjamin E. Jaffe, Rebutting the
Equality Principle: Adapting the Co-tenancy Law Model to Enhance the Remedies Available to Joint
Copyright Owners, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1549 (2011); Susan Keller, Collaboration in Theater:
Problems and Copyright Solutions, 33 UCLA L. REV. 891 (1986); Michael Landau, Joint Works
Under United States Copyright Law: Judicial Legislation Through Statutory Misinterpretation, 54
IDEA 157 (2014); Robert P. Merges, Locke for Masses: Property Rights and the Products of Collective Creativity, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1179 (2008); J. David Yarbrough, Jr., Comment, What’s
Mine Might Be Yours: Why We Should Rethink the Default Rule for Copyright Co-ownership in Joint
Works, 76 TUL. L. REV. 493 (2001).
4
766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’g on banc granted, 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2014).
5
Adi Robertson, YouTube Must Take Down Explosive ‘Innocence of Muslims’ Video in Copyright Suit, VERGE (Feb. 26, 2014, 1:03 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/2/26/
5449826/google-youtube-must-remove-innocence-of-muslims-video-in-copyright-suit;
Eugene Volokh, Copyright Meets “Innocence of Muslims”: Ninth Circuit Orders Removal of Movie
from YouTube, on Copyright Grounds, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.washington
post.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/02/26/copyright-meets-innocence-of-mus
lims-ninth-circuit-orders-removal-of-movie-from-youtube-on-copyright-grounds/.
6
202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000).
7
See id. at 1229, 1238.
8
147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998).
9
See id. at 205.
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Despite the frequency of disputes among collaborators, the law
has yet to produce a satisfactory formulation for allocating rights. No
less than a half-dozen legal doctrines potentially affect the rights of
multiple contributors to copyrighted works.10 Yet, the current legal
tools have proved irremediably ill suited for tackling the intricate yet
crucially important topic of works arising from multiple contributions.
Not only do the doctrines lead to inconsistent results, they also fail to
offer legal structures that reflect the true interests of the multiple contributors and the societal interest in optimizing the utilization of
works of intellectual property.11
The adverse effects of unsatisfactory resolutions of collaborators’
rights go well beyond questions of distributive justice among the litigants. How copyright law treats collaborators’ rights affects two other
crucial interests: the incentive to create and the efficiency of use.
Consider, first, incentives to create. The law’s treatment of multiple contributors greatly affects the likelihood that certain works will
be created at all. The promises made by the law to potential contributors affect their incentives to join in the creation of future works. Potential contributors will be reluctant to take part in creating a work if
they fear that they will not receive adequate compensation. As a result, if the law errs in its distribution of rights, works that can only be
produced with the contribution of many individuals might never be
created, to the detriment of society as a whole.
Now consider the efficiency of use. The law’s allocation of the
rights to manage copyrighted works potentially plays a decisive role in
determining the likelihood that copyrighted works will be efficiently
exploited by society. The number of authors recognized by law is of
vital importance to future uses of copyrighted works. An excess of
authors with full rights to license copyrighted works would essentially
eviscerate the value of copyright by ending the monopoly protection it
gives to creators. To take an extreme example, imagine that every one
of the tens of thousands of employees of Microsoft enjoyed the rights
of joint authors in a popular program like Microsoft Word. A license
from any of these joint authors could give the licensee full rights in
the word processing program. No other author could block such licensing deals. The competition of the thousands of authors to sell
licenses would tend to drive the price of the work down to the marginal cost of the license, i.e., zero. On the other hand, an excess of
authors with veto rights would essentially guarantee nonuse of the
10
As we discuss infra Part I, these doctrines include such doctrines of authorship as
work-made-for-hire, joint authorship, and, for lack of a better term, authorship; doctrines
for compound works such as derivative works and compilations; and doctrines for transferring rights, such as implied license.
11
See infra Part I.
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work. Consider again the example of Microsoft Word, but this time
imagine that each of the tens of thousands of employees had a separate copyright interest in the few lines of code she or he contributed
and that the program could only be licensed when all contributors
agreed. No one could license use of the program as a whole without
the consent of tens of thousands of people, some of whom might be
on vacation, and others of whom might be irrational, spiteful, or just
plain disagreeable.
Unfortunately, given the way copyright law currently treats questions of ownership, resolutions that encourage efficient use of copyrighted works tend to undermine incentives to create. Conversely,
judgments that best protect incentives to create copyrighted works
lower the likelihood that the works will be efficiently managed. The
reason for this is straightforward. Granting collaborators a share in
the rights of ownership incentivizes their participation in creating the
work. However, it also reduces the likelihood that the work will be
well managed. As we explore in greater detail in Part I, under current
doctrine more owners almost certainly means either dissipation of the
value of copyright or underuse of the copyrighted work. Shutting collaborators out of an ownership interest preserves good management
of the copyrighted work but reduces the likelihood that potential future collaborators will want to contribute their share to creating
works.
This Article offers a novel approach to allocating rights among
collaborators; it proposes an entirely new doctrine that recognizes a
new form of ownership in copyright assets.
Our proposal is based on two central insights. First, the problems
copyright encounters in coupling ownership with management are
not unique to the law of copyright. Other fields of law—most notably
property law—have encountered similar dilemmas,12 and resolved
them by decoupling ownership and management.13 As we will show,
the doctrines used in other fields of law can be adapted to copyright.14
Second, long before questions about collaboration took center
stage in copyright law, the field of property confronted and analyzed
the question of how allocating and dividing property rights affects the
management of assets.15 Several property theorists have shown how
excessive divisions of property rights can create an “anticommons”
12
See Merges, supra note 3, at 1187 (noting that the challenge of multiple rightsholders exists in many legal areas, including intellectual property, and that one solution is
to construct “a single focal point entity to represent the larger group”).
13
See infra Part II.
14
See infra Part II.A.
15
See infra Part II.A.1.
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that paralyzes the use of assets.16 Others have shown how denying
individuals the right to veto uses of an asset—essentially permitting
almost anyone to use the asset without penalty—can create a “commons” that leads to excessive exploitation of the asset.17 We show that
property analyses of commons and anticommons can be applied to
copyright (with some adaptation), and that they can point the way to
solutions that improve management of copyright assets.
Drawing on the laws of property and copyright, we propose a
form of “copyright trust” that concentrates the power of management
in a single individual while diffusing the benefits of ownership among
many contributors. This decoupling of ownership and management,
we show, overcomes the dilemma posed by the competition between
the incentives to create and the efficiency of use. We show that when
our proposed copyright trusts are in place, collaborators are still incentivized to contribute to creating works because they are guaranteed a fair share of the profits. At the same time, our proposed
copyright trusts streamline management of copyrighted works by
keeping control of the work in the hands of a single person, ensuring
that the copyrighted work will be used efficiently. Thus, our proposed
doctrine promotes the competing goals of reducing disputes among
contributors, encouraging the collaborative creation of works and incentivizing the optimal management of existing works.18
To illustrate how our new doctrine would work in practice, consider how it might affect the outcome of two recent authorship
disputes.
In Aalmuhammed v. Lee,19 Jefri Aalmuhammed, who had written
several pieces of dialogue and scenes in Spike Lee’s biographical film
about Malcolm X, claimed a share of the film as a joint author.20 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff’s claims of copyright on the grounds that Aalmuhammed was neither a joint author of
the entire film, nor the author of the scenes he wrote.21 Thus, the
Aalmuhammed court protected efficiency of use at the expense of the
incentive to create; it ensured the studio could manage the film with16
See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP
WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 2 (2008); Michael A. Heller, The
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV.
621, 677 (1998) [hereinafter Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons]; Michael A. Heller &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research,
280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998); Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics and the Law of Property, in
ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 6 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.,
1982).
17
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968).
18
See infra Part II.C.
19
202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000).
20
Id. at 1229–30.
21
Id. at 1236.
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out interference, but it disincentived future contributions to film like
Aalmuhammed’s. Our proposed doctrine would have allowed the
court to protect efficiency of future uses of the film while still incentivizing future screenwriters by guaranteeing remuneration. Specifically, the court could have made the movie studio an “owner-trustee”
with all the rights and powers of control, while recognizing
Aalmhuammed as an “owner-beneficiary” with a right to receive compensation from the proceeds of the movie.
In New York Times Co. v. Tasini,22 by contrast, Jonathan Tasini, a
freelance author, claimed separate ownership in an article he had
contributed to the New York Times.23 The Supreme Court ruled that
Tasini retained ownership of his article and the Times’s license to print
the article in its daily newspaper did not allow it to include the article
in an electronic database.24 Thus, the Court chose to protect incentives to create at the expense of the efficient use of the work. The
majority elected to honor the rights of the freelance journalists even
though the decision ran the risk that the digital editions of the New
York Times would be offered sans the contributions of the freelance
journalists. Under our solution, the Court would have been spared
the “Solomonic choice.” It could have declared the New York Times
owner-trustee with full managerial prerogatives over the content of
the newspaper while bestowing on the freelance journalists the status
of owner-beneficiaries who have an entitlement to a certain prorated
percentage of the royalties the New York Times received in exchange
for its decision to license content to computerized databases.
It should be emphasized that the proposed doctrine of “copyright
trust” is intended to supplement, not replace, current doctrine. It is
designed to enrich the menu of options available to courts in deciding
authorship issues. The addition of our solution to the judicial toolbox
would not only make it richer, however; it would infuse current law
with much needed flexibility that is sorely missing from other authorship doctrines. We are therefore confident that our proposal can dramatically improve the management of copyright disputes among
collaborators.
Structurally, our Article unfolds divided into three parts. Part I
lays out the intricacies of current doctrines concerning multiple contributions to copyrighted works. In it, we discuss the various methods
by which lawmakers and courts have sought to deal with the challenge
presented by works comprised of multiple contributions. We show
that the doctrinal tools provided by extant copyright law are ill suited
for the task assigned to them and that consequently our law falls short
22
23
24

533 U.S. 483 (2001).
See id. at 488, 491.
See id. at 506.
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of promoting the goals that underlie our copyright system. In Part II,
we offer our proposed doctrinal solution. We explain how existing
organizational tools in the world of property, as well as corporate law,
can be imported into copyright law in order to better achieve the normative goals of copyright regarding collaborative works. Additionally,
we provide examples of how our proposal could be used to resolve
many of the shortcomings of current law. Finally, in Part III, we address potential objections to our proposal, both practical and
theoretical.
I
DOCTRINE
Collaborative production of expressive works plays an ever-increasing role in the domain of copyright law.25 If in the past, collaborative production characterized limited categories of expressive works,
such as movies and software, in the present, collaborative production
has permeated many creative sectors that were traditionally bastions of
sole authorship thanks to the availability of new technology that facilitates cooperation among creators.26 Many literary works, pictorial
works, and games, especially in digital media, owe their origin to the
labors of more than one creator.27 One might have thought that centuries after its birth, copyright law would be well equipped to handle
the challenge of collaborative works, but the truth is disappointing.
The law is a hodgepodge of intricate and inconsistent doctrines that
provides, at best, very partial and tenuous solutions to the challenge of
collaborative authorship.
A. The Copyright Act of 1976
We begin by examining the explicit statutory tools for dealing
with collaborations. The Copyright Act directly addresses issues concerning collaboration in copyrighted works in several places. Unfortunately, as we shall see, the different legislative schemes do not add
up to a uniform or comprehensive approach.
25
F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures Under
U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 225, 230–31 (2001); Paulette S. Fox, Note, Preserving
the Collaborative Spirit of American Theater: The Need for a “Joint Authorship Default Rule” in Light
of the Rent Decision’s Unanswered Question, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 497, 498–500
(2001).
26
See Fox, supra note 25, at 498–99.
27
See Mark Cooper, From Wifi to Wikis and Open Source: The Political Economy of Collaborative Production in the Digital Information Age, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 125, 126–27
(2006); Ira V. Heffan, Note, Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in the Digital Age, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 1487, 1488–89 (1997).
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1. Ownership
The most important statutory tool for handling collaboration is
ownership. The basic rules of ownership of copyrighted works are
found in section 201 of the Act.28 The basic rule for noncollaborative
works is simple: the author owns copyright in works she creates.29 Unfortunately, the simplicity ends there. The Copyright Act creates no
less than three different (and not entirely consistent) doctrines for
dealing with collaborative works.30
a. Work Made for Hire
The “work-made-for-hire” doctrine allocates ownership of copyrighted works made by an employee to an employer.31 When this doctrine fully applies to all contributions to a work, only the employer
owns a copyright in the result.32 The doctrine might appear to lend
needed clarity to nearly all questions regarding ownership where a
corporation or other organization is involved. Unfortunately, it does
not. The doctrine fails to resolve many important questions regarding
copyrighted works even when produced within a corporate
environment.
The work-made-for-hire doctrine is frightfully complicated. To
begin with, the doctrine requires a specific employer-employee relationship within the bounds of agency law.33 This means, for example,
that where a programming company outsources writing of a particular
module to an outside contractor, the work-made-for-hire doctrine
does not apply.34 Additionally, even for regular employees, the doctrine only applies to work done within the “scope of [an employee’s]
employment.”35 Thus, for example, in the case of Roeslin III v. District
of Columbia, the court denied work-made-for-hire status to a computer
program for handling survey data written by a labor economist whose
duties included collecting and evaluating the data.36 The court reasoned that programming was outside the scope of the economist’s employment.37 Similarly, in Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer, a case involving a
dispute over the rights in a computer program pertaining to satellite
28

17 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
See id. § 201(a).
30
See id. § 201(a)–(c).
31
Id. § 201(b).
32
See id.; Casey & Sawicki, supra note 3, at 1724.
33
See Cmty. for Creative Non-violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–41 (1989); Casey &
Sawicki, supra note 3, at 1724–25.
34
Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 864 (2d Cir. 1992).
35
Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1994).
36
921 F. Supp. 793, 797–98 (D.D.C. 1995) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 228 (1958)).
37
See id.
29

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-5\CRN501.txt

1024

unknown

Seq: 10

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

12-JUN-15

12:29

[Vol. 100:1015

orbits, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that even though the
defendant was an employee of the plaintiff and the program came
within the type of work he was hired to perform, it was not a work
made for hire since it was written outside the time and space limitations of the employment and the employee was not “motivated by a
desire to further [Avtec’s] corporate goals.”38
The law permits clarifications of work-made-for-hire status by special agreement,39 but this, too, can only be done within certain
bounds. For instance, while an agreement may extend
work-made-for-hire status to work done by an independent contractor,
the law will only recognize the validity of such agreements if the work
is of a specified kind, such as a part of a motion picture, or a translation.40 Section 101 of the Copyright Act gives a list of ten kinds of
works for which the law will recognize the validity of agreements to
grant work-made-for-hire status to “specially ordered or commissioned” works.41 The list of ten works ranges from the specific, such
as an “instructional text,” to the general, such as a “compilation.”42
Adding to the confusion, some of the listed types of works are defined
by the Copyright Act (e.g., “compilation”), while others are not (e.g.,
“answer material for a test”).43 Worse yet, some of the terms are defined for the entire Copyright Act, while others are defined only for
purposes of work-made-for-hire.44
Needless to say, the doctrine leaves many disputes regarding collaborative works without clear answers. Even if a work is commissioned in advance by a corporation, and the corporation’s
management signs work-made-for-hire agreements with everyone who
labors in producing the work, the work-made-for-hire doctrine may
still fail to guarantee the corporation’s ownership of the resulting
rights in the copyrighted work.45 At the same time, the
work-made-for-hire doctrine may capture the rights resulting from an
artist’s creative output and reassign them to the artist’s employer,
even though neither artist nor employer contemplated that result.46
It should be noted that where the work-made-for-hire doctrine
does apply, the results are drastic. The employee enjoys no rights
38

21 F.3d at 572.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“work made for hire” includes a commissioned work in
certain situations where there is an express written agreement providing so).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
See id.
44
For example, “supplementary works” and “instructional texts” are defined specifically for the purpose of the work-made-for-hire scenario, but other terms such as “collective
works” and “motion pictures” are terms defined with respect to all copyrighted works. Id.
45
See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text.
46
See Dougherty, supra note 25, at 239.
39
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whatsoever in the resulting work; all rights belong to the employer.47
The rights denied to the employee include even some items that
would belong to an author that had voluntarily sold all copyright to
the employer. For instance, an ordinary author may terminate a transfer of copyright after the fact, even if the contract had specified otherwise.48 (The Copyright Act specifies that such terminations can only
be done within a certain time period, several decades after the transfer.)49 However, an employee has no right to terminate the transfer
of rights to an employer.50
b. Joint Authorship
Where the work-made-for-hire doctrine aims to simplify rights by
concentrating ownership in a single person or entity (the employer),
the joint authorship doctrine aims to achieve equity by splitting rights
among all joint authors.
According to the Copyright Act, the “authors of a joint work are
coowners of copyright in the work.”51 The Copyright Act defines a
joint work as one “prepared by two or more authors with the intention
that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”52
While the law defines the contributors’ intentions as the key feature in identifying joint works, courts have often sought to avoid the
difficult questions concerning the parties’ mental states by searching
for other potential limitations on joint authorship. Thus, for example, several cases would deny contributors to a work the status of joint
author on the grounds that the contributions, when considered separately, would not themselves have constituted a copyrighted work.53
Ultimately, however, questions of intent are unavoidable. Thus, for
example, in Childress v. Taylor, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
denied the status of a joint work to a play written by Alice Childress.54
The court acknowledged that Childress had written the play at the
suggestion and with the considerable assistance of Clarice Taylor.55
47

17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).
See id. § 203.
49
See id.
50
See id. § 203(a).
51
Id. § 201(a).
52
Id. § 101.
53
Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Solutions, Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 114–15 (2d Cir.
2002); Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000); Erickson v. Trinity
Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1071–73 (7th Cir. 1994); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500,
506–07 (2d Cir. 1991); Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1990);
M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1493 (11th Cir. 1990); S.O.S.,
Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 1989).
54
Childress, 945 F.2d at 509.
55
See id.
48
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However, the court ruled that only Taylor, but not Childress, had intended for the two to share the status of “joint authors.”56 Nonetheless, courts have favored objective criteria for determining intent.57
For instance, in adjudicating Jefri Aalmuhammed’s claim of joint authorship of the film Malcolm X in Aalmuhammed v. Lee,58 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals offered a variety of indicators for determining contributors’ intent, including manifestations of joint authorship
such as a cowriting credit.59
As scholars have noted, many aspects of joint authorship remain
controversial and unclear.60 Indeed, even items that are generally
thought to be clear are quite hazy upon closer review. For instance, it
is generally agreed that collaborators may resolve many issues related
to their rights if they voluntarily agree on joint authorship.61 However, there are surprisingly few cases on the subject. The case authority, such as it is, tells a more complex story.62 Advance agreement can
establish the existence of a joint authorship.63 However, if the agreement varies the terms of the joint authorship, for example by varying
the percentage ownership from the default 50%-50% to a 90%-10%
split that better reflects the parties’ actual contributions, the courts
will view the relevant parts of the agreement as a transfer of ownership, and thus subject to all the rules of transfer, rather than an intrinsic part of the joint ownership.64
More broadly, the law has little to say about the meaning of joint
authorship for the joint authors. The law suffices with the laconic instruction that “[t]he authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright
in the work.”65 The omission of more specific instruction is apparently deliberate. As the house report for the 1976 Copyright Act tells
us,
[t]here is . . . no need for a specific statutory provision concerning
the rights and duties of the coowners of a work; court-made law on
56

Id.
See Balganesh, supra note 3, at 1737.
58
202 F.3d 1227.
59
Id. at 1234.
60
See Balganesh, supra note 3; George W. Hutchinson, Can the Federal Courts Save Rock
Music?: Why a Default Joint Authorship Rule Should Be Adopted to Protect Co-authors Under United
States Copyright Law, 5 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 77, 81–89 (2003); Steven S. Kan, Court
Standards on Joint Inventorship & Authorship, 19 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 267,
297–300 (2009); Mary LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator: Preserving the Rights of Joint Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193, 213–20 (2001); Russ VerSteeg, Intent, Originality, Creativity and Joint Authorship, 68 BROOK L. REV. 123, 125–34 (2002).
61
Childress, 945 F.2d at 507; see 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:7 (2014).
62
See VerSteeg, supra note 60, at 151–58.
63
Childress, 945 F.2d at 507.
64
See Papa’s-June Music, Inc. v. McLean, 921 F. Supp. 1154, 1157–58 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Keller, supra note 3, at 912–14.
65
17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012).
57
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this point is left undisturbed. Under the bill, as under the present
law, coowners of a copyright would be treated generally as tenants
in common, with each coowner having an independent right to use
of license the use of a work, subject to a duty of accounting to the
other coowners for any profits.66

Thus, joint authorship is an incomplete remedy for the dilemmas
of contributors for several reasons. First of all, contributors may not
have the presence of mind to reach agreement in advance of their
work or to record sufficient evidence of their work to prove that they
have an agreement. In many cases, negotiations are costly, and it is
only after the fact that revenues prove sufficient to have invested in
contracting. Of course, after the fact is too late; joint authorship depends on the principals’ intent during creation of the work, not
afterward.
Second, even if the parties reach an agreement in advance, the
nature of joint authorship is partially fixed by law, meaning that even
if the joint authors agree in advance to divide their rights, only certain
divisions are possible. The historic approach to joint authorship dictates that joint authors have undivided rights in the whole of ownership (like tenants in common).67 Joint authors may agree to vary their
respective shares (for instance, two joint authors may agree in advance
that they will split their ownership 90%-10%)68 or to deny themselves
one or more of the exclusive rights that would otherwise inhere in
copyright ownership (for example, authors may deny themselves the
right to make derivative works without one another’s consent),69 but
such agreements will likely be viewed as transfers of ownership. Apparently this means, inter alia, that some aspects of the agreement are
subject to termination. In addition, authors may not deny one another the right to convey nonexclusive licenses because such licenses
do not diminish the value of the copyrighted work.70 Conversely, only
by acting in concert can joint authors grant an exclusive license.71
Likewise, even where owners have different percentages of ownership,
they are still viewed as tenants in common with all the attendant rights
of coownership.72
Third, joint authorship often gives too much to junior contributors. The default rules of joint authorship give each joint author an
66

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976).
See Childress, 945 F.2d at 508.
68
See Papa’s-June Music, 921 F. Supp. at 1158.
69
See id.
70
See Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 2007).
71
See id. at 101. The rules of licensing naturally imply one another. Unless all the
authors agree, any remaining joint author can convey a nonexclusive license without the
consent of the remaining authors. Thus, a license can only be exclusive if all joint authors
act together.
72
See Yarbrough, Jr., supra note 3, at 496.
67
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equal share of the rights in the work, including the rights to
reproduce, display, perform, adapt and distribute, as well as the
all-important rights to issue nonexclusive licenses and veto the conveyance of exclusive licenses.73 This is a formidable package to give each
and every junior collaborator. It would obviously be quite problematic for every one of the hundreds of contributors to a film or a computer program to enjoy each of these rights. Stated otherwise, joint
authorship—at least in the default form employed today—is not a realistic legal form for copyrighted works with many contributors. As we
discuss infra, the result would certainly be the intellectual property
equivalent of a commons, which property theory shows leads to excessive exploitation of the asset.74 With each of the many contributors
able to sell a license to the work, the price of using the work would
decline toward zero, and all profit would be dissipated.75
c. Collective Work
The law of collective works and compilations adds yet a further
complication to the doctrinal puzzle.
To understand why, it is important to draw attention to a peculiar
but important feature of copyright law. Copyright law does not just
protect discrete works, like books. It also protects component parts of
works, like chapters or paragraphs within books.76 It also protects
hard-to-define component aspects like plot lines,77 characters,78 or
even the “look and feel” of works.79 Of course, at some point, the
components are no longer protected. One cannot copyright a common single word, for example, even if it plays an extremely important
role in a novel (like “clues” or “detective”).80
Just as we can disaggregate works into many component parts—
some copyrighted, some not—items can be aggregated to make copyrighted works. A collection of uncopyrightable numbers can nevertheless together become a copyrighted database due to the original
arrangement and selection of the numbers.81 More importantly for
73

17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
See Floris Kreiken & David Koepsell, Coase and Copyright, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y 1, 10–12 (2013); infra Part II.A.1.
75
Kreiken & Koepsell, supra note 74, at 10–12: Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1037–38 (2005).
76
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565–66 (1985).
77
Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1362–63 (9th Cir. 1990); Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533, 536–37 (2d Cir. 1938).
78
WILLIAM F. PATRY, 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:164 (2014).
79
Jack Russo & Jamie Nafziger, Software “Look and Feel” Protection in the 1990s, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 571, 572 (1993).
80
2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 78, § 4.2.
81
Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 515 (2d
Cir. 1991).
74
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our purposes, a copyrighted work may be an aggregation of copyrighted components. For instance, in copyright law, it is possible for
there to be 100 copyrights to each of 100 pieces of art on 100 jigsaw
pieces and an entirely different copyright for the completed jigsaw
puzzle. In copyright terminology, a work that is an aggregation of
components is called a “compilation.”82 If the components of the
compilation are themselves copyrighted works (like our hypothetical
jigsaw puzzle), the compilation is called a “collective work.”83
Copyright law does not automatically allocate all the ownership
interests in collective works to a single person. It is possible for 100
different people to own each of the 100 copyrights in the jigsaw piece
art, and for a 101st person to own the copyright in the jigsaw puzzle as
a whole. The copyright in the work as a whole is distinct and limited.84 In the words of the Copyright Act, the copyright in a compilation “extends only to the material contributed by the author of such
work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the
work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting
material.”85
It should be evident why this feature of the law carries the potential for dividing up ownership rights in a way that would render works
unusable. As property theory shows, excessive fragmentation of ownership rights in an asset leads to an “anticommons” in which the asset
is underutilized.86 In an extreme case, the copyright in the collective
work might end up being worthless because any exercise of rights regarding the collective work as a whole would necessarily involve potentially forbidden actions toward the component parts.
The law partially resolves this problem by granting a statutory default license for the owner of the collective work regarding the component works. Under the law, “the owner of copyright in the
collective work is presumed to have . . . the privilege of reproducing
and distributing [any component] contribution [but only] as part of
that . . . collective work, [or a] revision of that collective work, [or a]
later collective work in the same series.”87 This statutory license is extremely narrow. In New York Times Co. v. Tasini, the Supreme Court
illustrated just how narrow the license is by ruling that the New York
Times could not use its “collective work” copyright in its own
newspaper to publish a database of all of its earlier published articles88
because the Times did not own the separate copyrights in articles
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
Id.
See id. § 103(b).
Id.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text; infra Part II.A.1.
17 U.S.C. § 201(c).
533 U.S. 483, 488 (2001).
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written by freelance journalists89 and the database was not a “revision”
of the published newspapers.90
Thus, the danger that collective works will be underutilized because they fall into the dynamics of anticommons is a real one. And
collective works are ubiquitous in copyright. Although the Copyright
Act refers to law review (and other periodical) issues, anthologies, and
encyclopedias as examples of collective works,91 many more works—
such as collaboratively produced films, computer programs, and
murals—are potentially collective works under the definition of the
act. Indeed, every time a work results from multiple contributions
that are not otherwise covered by the work-made-for-hire and joint
authorship doctrines, the work is prima facie a collective work, covered by many copyrights, with only a limited copyright for the
organizer.92
If this weren’t enough, the law adds a further complication with
the category of “derivative works.” A copyrighted work that contains
parts of an earlier work is a derivative work, according to the Copyright Act.93 A compilation may be a derivative work, but a derivative
work need not be a compilation.94 The statutory definition of derivative works is extremely broad, encompassing all works “based upon
one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”95 The
statute adds that a “work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations,
elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an
original work of authorship” is also a derivative work.96
For the most part, the rules of compilations and derivative works
are identical as far as collaborators are concerned. Whether we call
the subsequent work a derivative work or a compilation, it has a copyright that is separate from the component or base parts that covers
only the new contributions. Yet, there are some interesting distinctions between the statutory treatments of derivative works and compilations (and other collective works). For instance, as we have seen,
the statute grants the author of a collective work a limited license regarding contributions;97 the statute does not expressly create any simi89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Id. at 493–94.
Id. at 504.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
See id. §§ 101, 106A.
Id. § 101.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 201(c).
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lar license for the authors of derivative works.98 At the same time, the
statute does create several narrow but special rights for owners of derivative works.99
These slight differences in treatment of derivative works, collective works, and compilations, have the potential to create unnecessary
confusion.
d. Combining the Tools
It should be clear that the aforementioned ownership doctrines
are not airtight categories. Owners—and courts—can mix and match.
A single work can be a joint work with joint authors, one or more of
whom may be an employer who owns others’ work by virtue of the
work-made-for-hire doctrine, while the single work is also a part of a
larger collective work. Thus, when a court arrives at the decision that
one of the doctrines applies to ownership of a given work, it cannot
rest easy. Another doctrine or two may also apply. Worse, courts will
have to figure out how the doctrines interact with one another.
As well, courts are acutely aware of the problems presented by
each of the doctrines. This can, and does, affect their readiness to
apply them to given cases. Consider, for example, the case of Thomson
v. Larson.100 Plaintiff Lynn Thomson had claimed the right of joint
authorship together with Jonathan Larson in a new version of the
Broadway musical Rent.101 Larson was the playwright and Thomson a
“dramaturg” hired by Larson to help “clarify[ ] the storyline of the
musical” by working face-to-face with Larson in changing the script.102
The court rejected Thomson’s claim of joint authorship on the
grounds that “Mr. Larson never regarded himself as a joint author
with Ms. Thomson,”103 but then observed that this still left open the
question of whether Thomson “automatically retain[ed] exclusive
copyright interests in the material she contributed to the [collective]
work.”104 The court confessed that this presented the court with
“somewhat of a conundrum.”105 The court acknowledged a genuine
legal difficulty in determining whether “a person who makes
a . . . copyrightable contribution but cannot meet the mutual intent
98

See id. § 201.
Id. § 104A(d)(3) (reliance placed on restored works for creating derivative works,
protected against infringement action); id. § 203(b)(1) (termination of license shall not
affect derivative works created prior to such termination); id. § 304(a)(4)(A) (derivative
works unaffected if application for renewal or extension of copyright in the original work
not made within one year before the expiration of copyright).
100
147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998).
101
Id. at 198.
102
Id. at 197.
103
Id. at 202 n.20, 205.
104
Id. at 196.
105
Id. at 205.
99
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requirement of coauthorship, retains, in the absence of a
work-for-hire agreement or of any explicit contractual assignment of
the copyright, any rights and interests in his or her own contribution.”106 The court admitted as well its great reluctance in awarding
Thomson “rights which she never imagined, much less sought, and
which she would be loathe to enforce,” and it therefore dismissed the
potential claim on procedural grounds while refusing to express any
opinion on its merits.107
Thomson, sadly, is not atypical in demonstrating the problems
posed by the interacting doctrines as currently understood. The logic
of the statute seems inexorably to lead to anticommons or commons
problems. Courts naturally use procedural or other escape routes to
try to avoid the anticipated problems.
2. Transfer
Before moving from the statutory tools for dealing with collaborators to judicially-created tools, it is important to take account of one
final statutory doctrine.
The initial allocation of rights according to the statute is not necessarily the final allocation. Authors are the initial owners of copyrights, but, for the most part, the statute permits the author to transfer
the rights to a new owner.108 Section 201(d) permits free transfer of
copyright rights and portions thereof by means of inter vivos transfers
or inheritance.109 If the transfer of a right is exclusive, the transferee
becomes an “owner” entitled to enforce the right in question.110 On
its face, the possibility of contracting can solve disputes among collaborators in a creative work. Upon closer examination, however, it becomes clear that transfers of rights are not a panacea. Transfers have
both practical and legal limitations.
From a practical standpoint, there is a big gap between the ability
of the relevant parties to execute transfers ex ante, before a work is
created, and ex post, after it came into being. Ex ante, the respective
bargaining positions of the parties are determined predominantly by
their expected contribution to the work product and by the availability of alternatives. Ex post, the bargaining powers of the parties are
determined mostly by the law. If the law vests in a certain party a
copyright in the work product, she gets the power to use the work and
license it to others (subject to other rightsholders’ ability to do the
same) irrespective of the magnitude of her contribution. A party who
106
107
108
109
110

Id. at 206.
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2012).
Id.
Id. § 201(d)(2).
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contributed very little to the final product, barely enough to receive a
copyright, can demand an amount far in excess of her creative contribution in exchange for agreeing to transfer her rights in the work.
Such demands, whether strategic or not, are likely to be perceived as
extortionary by the other contributors and are certainly likely to increase transaction costs. As Robert Cooter famously pointed out,
many contractual negotiations fail for distributional reasons—namely,
the inability of the parties to divide the contractual surplus between
them.111 Ex post negotiations among contributors to copyrighted
content provide a prime example of this dynamic. For this reason,
many legal doctrines adopt an entirely different approach to questions that arise ex post from those that arise ex ante.112
From a legal standpoint, transfers do not provide a fool-proof solution because the law limits authors’ rights of transfer. In earlier versions of the Copyright Act, copyright protection was divided
temporally into two terms, and, in many cases, authors could not
transfer in advance their rights to the second term.113 Several highprofile cases, such as Stewart v. Abend,114 highlighted how this limitation on transfers can tie up copyrighted works and make exploitation
more costly and difficult. Stewart concerned the copyright in a short
story published in 1942, on which the famous 1954 Alfred Hitchcock
film Rear Window was based.115 The copyright in the short story was
set to expire in 2037; however, the initial term of protection expired
in 1970.116 Since it is a derivative work, the film Rear Window cannot
legally be used without a valid license to the short story on which it is
based.117 In Stewart, Sheldon Abend, who had succeeded to the copyright in the short story, successfully blocked broadcast of Rear Window
on television on the theory that the movie studio’s license had expired
at the end of the initial term, requiring the studio to purchase a new
license for any post-1970 use of the film.118
111

Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 28 (1982).
These include doctrines such as mistaken improver doctrines, the doctrine of necessity, and the doctrine of accretion.
113
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 215 (1990).
114
Id.
115
Id. at 211–12.
116
See id. at 212.
117
Id. at 223.
118
Interestingly, after the litigation, Abend sold a license to the studio. Joy Newborg,
Is Universal Regretting Disturbia?, DUETS BLOG (Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.duetsblog.com/
2010/11/articles/idea-protection/is-universal-regretting-disturbia/. But Abend’s successor, the Stuart Abend Revocable Trust, found itself back in court recently when it sued the
makers of the 2007 film Disturbia, described by one critic as “a limp teenage by-the-numbers version of Rear Window.” Eriq Gardner, Exclusive: Decades-Old Legal Battle Over ‘Rear
Window’ Is Back On, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Oct. 29, 2010, 10:25 AM), http://
www.hollywoodreporter.com/blogs/thr-esq/exclusive-decades-old-legal-battle-33649.
112
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Transfers made after the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act
are subject to the termination provisions in the Act.119 In an attempt
to give authors a second bite of the apple, Congress empowered owners of the initial copyright to terminate transfers they executed in a
five-year period beginning in the thirty-fifth year after the execution
of the transfer and ending in the fortieth year after its execution.120
The termination rights established by Congress have proven to be of
great value to contributors to collaborative works that remained valuable thirty-five years after their creation. Not surprisingly, creators
started filing lawsuits to regain the rights in their valuable creations; in
turn, this has led to a spate of new litigation. In one celebrated case,
Victor Willis, the lead singer of the Village People, successfully exercised the termination right to regain the copyrights in the Village People’s successful songs.121 In another case, the estate of the animator
Jack Kirby sought to take advantage of the termination right to recapture the copyrights to many of the works in the repertoire of Marvel
Comics (that have since been acquired by Disney).122 In this case,
however, the court determined that Kirby was an employee of Marvel
Comics, whose expressive output was a work made for hire.123 As of
April 2013, 534 termination notices have been filed with the copyright
office,124 including notices by the heirs of Jerry Siegel and Joseph
Shuster (the creators of Superman),125 the Eagles126 and the children
of the late Ray Charles.127
Additionally, the Copyright Act creates a limited set of “moral
rights” that cannot be transferred at all.128 The moral rights, which
apply only to works of visual art, are granted to the author, and can be
waived but not sold.129 These moral rights include the rights of attribution (the right to have one’s authorship properly attributed)130 and
119

17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c) (2012).
Id. § 203(a)(3).
121
Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, No. 11-cv-1557 (BTM), 2012 WL 1598043 (S.D. Cal.
May 7, 2012).
122
Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2013).
123
Id. at 143.
124
See Ted Johnson, Legal Landmark: Artists Start to Reclaim Rights to Their Music, VARIETY
(Apr. 16, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://variety.com/2013/biz/features/artists-reclaim-rights-tomusic-1200334132/.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Dori Ann Hanswirth, “I’ll Be Back”: Termination Rights Under Section 203 of the Copyright Act, INTELL. PROP. MAG. (2012), available at http://m.hoganlovells.com/files/Publica
tion/e83ef548-c381-47ec-beaf-55427153237e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6143
4785-e4e8-4757-8b0a-58b0b20a8914/Termination%20Rights.pdf.
128
Laura Lee Van Velzen, Injecting a Dose of Duty into the Doctrines of Droit Moral, 74
IOWA L. REV. 629, 630 (1989).
129
17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (2012).
130
Id. § 106A(a)(1).
120
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integrity (the right to protect the work from “distortion”).131 Curiously, these moral rights do not apply at all in the case of works made
for hire.132 The result is that for a certain class of works, subsequent
agreements are unable to resolve certain kinds of disputes among
collaborators.
B. Judicial Doctrines
Given the inadequacy of the statutory tools for resolving disputes
about collaboration in the creation of copyrighted works, it is unsurprising that courts have taken to fashioning judge-made law in order
to resolve the cases. Two legal concepts, in particular, have played an
important role: judicial interpretations of the concept of authorship
and implied license.
1. Authorship
Judicial interpretations of authorship as a method of resolving
disputes about collaborations are perhaps best seen in the case of Aalmuhammed.133 The Aalmuhammed case, as we noted above, involved
scenes and dialogue penned by Aalmuhammed for inclusion in a
Spike Lee-directed biographic film of Malcolm X.134 In the absence
of writing showing a work-made-for-hire relationship or a transfer of
rights by Aalmuhammed, the two statutory tools left to the court in
vindicating Aalmuhammed’s claims were the doctrines of joint authorship and collective works.135 Neither option was particularly attractive
to the court. Finding Aalmuhammed to be a joint author would have
given Aalmuhammed a share in decision-making power, including,
most importantly, the right to grant licenses; finding Aalmuhammed
to be the author of a separate work incorporated within the larger
collective work of the film would have given Aalmuhammed veto
power over most future uses of the work.136 In any event, the court
chose an entirely different way of disposing of the case.
Acknowledging that some of the facts favored an interpretation
of Aalmuhammed as a joint author (such as the copyrightability of
Aalmuhammed’s contribution and the clear joint intent that
Aalmuhammed’s work would become a part of the larger whole), the
131
132

Id. § 106A(a)(3).
Id. § 101 (definition of a “work of visual art” expressly excludes works made for

hire).
133

Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1229–30.
135
See supra Part I.A.1(listing and discussing these three different statutory tools for
dealing with collaborations).
136
Interestingly, while the opinion considers at length the possibility of joint authorship, it does not mention that the film might be a collective work. The reason for the
omission is not clear.
134
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court ruled that Aalmuhammed could not claim rights because he was
not an author at all.137 Reaching beyond the statute, the court ruled
“that authorship is not the same thing as making a valuable and copyrightable contribution.”138 According to the court, “as the number of
contributors grows and the work itself becomes less the product of
one or two individuals who create it without much help, the word [authorship] is harder to apply.”139 Turning back to a nineteenth-century Supreme Court decision,140 the court ruled that an author is the
“master mind,” or “the person to whom the work owes its origin and
who superintended the whole work.”141 Thus, ruled the court, even if
everything else about Aalmuhammed’s work appeared to enjoy the
statutory protection of the Copyright Act, Aalmuhammed could claim
no rights in the work, since he was not its author.142
Aalmuhammed is far from the only case to employ the strategy of
denying rights on the grounds of lack of authorship. For instance, in
Lindsay v. The Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic,143 a court in
the Southern District of New York upheld the rights of Alexander
Lindsay, the director of a documentary film about salvaging the Titanic, against the claims of the actual photographers to the copyrighted footage of the salvage operation.144 The court acknowledged
that only the actual photographers were on the scene; Lindsay sat in a
ship safely away from the wreck.145 However, said the court, Lindsay
“exercised such a high degree of control over a film operation—including the type and amount of lighting used, the specific camera angles to be employed, and other detail-intensive artistic elements of a
film—such that the final product duplicates his conceptions and visions of what the film should look like,” and therefore he, and he
alone was the “author.”146
These cases illustrate a judicial doctrine of authorship that potentially denies many contributors to a copyrighted work any share in the
resulting rights. The doctrine denies rights as an author to anyone
but the “auteur” or “master mind,” reserving for that one person all
the rights of those working under him or her, even in the absence of a
work-made-for-fire relationship. The doctrine is thus potentially
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1236.
Id. at 1232.
Id.
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1233.
Id. at 1231.
No. 97-cv-9248 (HB), 1999 WL 816163 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1999).
Id. at *7.
Id. at *5.
Id.
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extremely harsh in its results, denying any legal rights whatsoever even
to very significant contributors like Aalmuhammed.
Perhaps due to the harshness of the result, the “master mind”
theory of authorship is not universally accepted. In Garcia v. Google,
Inc., for example, the court rejected the applicability of the doctrine
in determining whether Cindy Lee Garcia, an actress, could claim
rights in her performance in the controversial film Innocence of Muslims.147 Garcia had an extremely small role in the film, and her dialogue was redubbed in the final film.148 Indeed, she objected to the
inclusion of her performance in the film on the grounds that she was
led to believe that she was acting for a different film themed on a
desert adventure.149 There can be little question that Garcia was not
the “master mind” of the film. However, the court linked the authorship doctrine exclusively to the question of joint authorship, suggesting that where a contributor claimed ownership of a separate
component within the larger work, the contributor need not be a
master mind at all.150 The dissent correctly observed that this interpretation was a novel reinterpretation of the judicial doctrine of
authorship.151
2. Implied License
An entirely different judicial doctrine for dealing with problems
of collaboration utilizes the concept of transfer, rather than authorship.152 The strategy behind the judicial doctrine is to recognize separate copyrights in the separate contributions, but then find that the
collaborators have granted permission (in the form of an implied license) to use their separately copyrighted contribution.153
To understand the way courts use implied licenses, it is valuable
to look at the way the Copyright Act treats licenses more generally.
Licenses under the Copyright Act come in two varieties: exclusive and
nonexclusive. Exclusive licenses must be executed in a written instrument signed by the grantor.154 Nonexclusive licenses, by contrast, do
not require an agreement in writing.155 Courts, therefore, can find
that a nonexclusive license was created by the conduct of parties, even
147

766 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’g on banc granted, 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir.

2014).
148

Id. at 932.
Id.
150
Id. at 933–34.
151
Id. at 943–44 (Smith, J., dissenting).
152
See, e.g., Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 555 (9th Cir. 1990) (considering “a
transfer of copyright without a written agreement, an arrangement apparently not uncommon in the motion picture industry”).
153
See id. at 558.
154
17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2012).
155
Id. § 101.
149
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though no formal agreement was ever reached. Specifically, courts
can interpret the parties’ conduct to imply that they intended to create a license.156 Implied nonexclusive licenses constitute a powerful
tool in the hands of the courts. Courts have strong discretion when
deciding whether to imply a license. They are not subject to any formal restrictions, and the consequences of implying a license are less
drastic for the contributor than a finding of a complete transfer or
assignment.157 Since all implied licenses are nonexclusive by definition, the judicial recognition of an implied license in a particular dispute does not dramatically compromise the panoply of rights of the
owner-grantor, who remains in possession of all the exclusive rights
under the act sans the power to grant an exclusive license to another
party.158 Hence, implying a license provides courts with an attractive
way to resolve difficult copyright cases.
As an illustration, consider the case of Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen.159 Cohen, “a low-budget horror movie mogul,” commissioned Effects Associates, a special effects studio, to produce special effects
footage for the movie The Stuff.160 The studio produced the footage as
promised, but Cohen failed to pay the agreed upon consideration despite repeated demands from the studio.161 At that point, Effect Associates rescinded the contract. Undeterred, Cohen used the footage in
the movie.162 Effect Associates sued for copyright infringement and
breach of contract.163 In a surprising decision, Judge Kozinski ruled
that there was no copyright infringement since Cohen had an implied
nonexclusive license to use the disputed footage in his movie.164 This
entitled Effects Associates to payment, but did not give Effects Associates the right to complain about past performances of the movie.165
Implied licenses can resolve some but not all of the problems of
disputes among collaborators. Implied licenses are transfers just as
surely as express licenses and are thus subject to all of the limitations
of transfers, discussed supra. Some rights cannot be transferred at all,
and some transfers are revocable.166
156

See Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 555.
See id. at 559 (noting that “[c]opyright ownership is comprised of a bundle of
rights; in granting a nonexclusive license . . . [plaintiff] has given up only one stick from
that bundle . . . .”).
158
By definition, once a nonexclusive license is granted to some party, no one else can
be given an exclusive license.
159
908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990).
160
Id. at 555.
161
Id. at 556.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 559.
165
Id.
166
See supra Part I.A.2.
157
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Implied licenses also come with many question marks. The flexibility of implied licenses comes with a great deal of uncertainty. It is
impossible to know in advance whether a court will imply a license or
not or what its terms will be. For example, it is unclear why the court
in Effects Associates decided to imply a license in favor of Cohen but
refused to do the same in many other cases where a contractual relationship went sour.167 Courts have been wary to find implied licenses,
and they have used the doctrine infrequently.168 Consequently, the
precise conditions under which the doctrine applies are unknown.
The difficulty of determining whether an implied license exists is
exceeded by the difficulty in determining the scope of the license
once the court implies its existence. In Effects Associates, the court determined that the license was broad enough to cover incorporation of
the footage in the movie and the movie’s subsequent distribution.169
But the court’s opinion said little else about the implied license. How
long would it last? How could it be terminated? Did it cover production of derivative works, such as distribution with a soundtrack
dubbed in other languages? The key to this question should be interpreting the parties’ behavior, but that is no easy task. Indeed, Judge
Kozinski’s finding that Effects Associates granted Cohen an implied
nonexclusive license largely defies logic. Who else would want to license the special effects footage that was produced for Cohen’s horror movie? In this case, the footage was tailor-made for Cohen’s
movie.170 There is no general demand for this footage, and it cannot
be used for any other film or audio-visual work. The footage was produced exclusively for Cohen’s movie and has no use outside of it. It
would have made a lot more sense to find an implied exclusive license
in this case. But this option is barred by the Copyright Act.171 Hence,
the court, in its desire to find a way to allow Cohen to use the footage
and not let the entire movie go to waste, had to force a square peg
into a round doctrinal hole.

167
John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26, 40–42 (1st
Cir. 2003); Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d 505, 516–17 (4th Cir.
2002); Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 499–502 (6th Cir. 1998); Viacom Int’l Inc. v.
Fanzine Int’l Inc., No. 98-CIV-7448 (KMW), 2000 WL 1854903, at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. July 12,
2000).
168
Orit Fischman Afori, Implied License: An Emerging New Standard in Copyright Law, 25
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 275, 287 (2009).
169
Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 559.
170
See id. at 556.
171
See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2012).
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II
WHAT COPYRIGHT LAW CAN LEARN FROM PROPERTY
CORPORATE LAW

AND

The problem of multiple potential stakeholders in a single asset is
not exclusive to copyright law. Several legal areas have had to deal
with the question of how to satisfy the claims of multiple contributors
to a single venture. In fact, the default regime that applies to joint
works under the Copyright Act is not original to copyright law. It was
imported from the law of property. Property law has an extensive set
of rules that apply to owners who simultaneously hold ownership
shares in the same asset.172 Copyright law borrows from these rules in
viewing joint authors as tenants in common whose rights and obligations are largely similar to those tenants in common in real estate or
chattels.173
Another legal area that routinely deals with multiple stakeholders
is corporate law.174 Although not much utilized by copyright law, corporate law doctrines provide a particularly fertile ground for finding
solutions to the challenges presented by collaborative creation, as they
regularly deal with the allocation of rights and powers among multiple
collaborators in complex projects.175
In the discussion that follows, we will draw on insights from the
theoretical literatures on both property law and corporate law, as well
as on actual doctrines from both areas to propose a new legal approach to collaborative works.
A. Property
1. Commons and Anticommons
A natural starting point for our theoretical foray into property is
the body of scholarship concerning multiple potential claimants to a
single asset.
Perhaps the most famous problem of multiple claimants arises in
the context of the “commons.” The commons problem arises when
there are many users of a single asset with unlimited rights to exploit
it.176 As property theorists such as Harold Demsetz and, subsequently,
Garrett Hardin famously pointed out, assets with multiple owners will
172

Jaffe, supra note 3, at 1552–53.
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author-Stories:”
Narrative’s Implications for Moral Rights and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 57 (2001).
174
See infra notes 265–270 and accompanying text.
175
See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1045–46 (2008) [hereinafter Bell & Parchomovsky I].
176
Hardin, supra note 17, at 1244.

R

173

R

R
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be subject to overuse and ultimately to “ruin.”177 If everyone can fish
in a lake without limit, there will soon be no fish. Intellectual property goods are as liable to commons problems as any other property,
though the problems manifest themselves differently. Recognizing a
copyright in every contributor would allow each to utilize the work as
she saw fit, subject only to the rights of the other contributors to do
the same. If everyone could license and use the copyrighted work
without limit, the copyrighted asset would still be there after everyone’s use, but it would be worthless. Stated more generally, where
intangible goods are prone neither to exhaustion nor to overuse, the
commons problem takes the form of value dissipation.178 If every individual who contributed to a film could use it however she wanted
and license it to others, the studio would not be able to recoup its
investment in the enterprise.
Yet, at the opposite end of commons lies a different problem. If
lawmakers were to grant every contributor a veto power to block uses
of the work, they would create an anticommons problem. As Frank
Michelman initially noted,179 and Michael Heller developed and
demonstrated in a series of works,180 a legal regime that recognizes
blocking rights in multiple individuals invariably engenders an anticommons problem that leads to underutilization of assets—another
form of value destruction.181 Heller’s examples include the management of department stores in Russia after the collapse of communism.182 Ownership and management of the stores were divided
among thousands of worker-owners, who proved unable to make joint
decisions.183 The result, Heller shows, is the opposite of commons
property; instead of excessive use rights leading to excessive use, excessive veto rights lead to excessive idleness of the asset.184 As Heller
and others note, particularly in the context of patents,185 intellectual
property rights are vulnerable to anticommons just like other property
177

Id.
See id.
179
Michelman, supra note 16, at 6.
180
HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY, supra note 16, at 2; Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons, supra note 16, at 624; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 698.
181
Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons, supra note 16, at 624.
182
Id. at 622–23.
183
Id. at 636–37.
184
Id. at 639–40.
185
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1060–63 (2008); Heller &
Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 698; Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 186–87 (2004); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 121
(Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Note, Access to Bio-Knowledge:
From Gene Patents to Biomedical Materials, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 27 (2010).
178

R
R
R
R

R
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rights.186 Consider, for instance, a legal rule that gives each contributor an exclusive right in her contribution to the work, making that
part her “sole and despotic dominion,” pace Blackstone.187 Such a
rule would make works wholly unusable on account of high transaction costs and strategic coordination problems.188
2. Three Dimensions of Property
How can lawmakers navigate this treacherous course between
competing threats to the use of copyrighted assets? In a past work, we
observed that property policymaking necessarily involves choices
along three different dimensions: (1) number of owners, (2) the configuration of the asset, and (3) the scope of rights.189
Property law always involves defining some right or set of rights
belonging to one or more owners in a given asset. We will show that
our three-dimensional analysis is extremely useful for resolving
problems raised by collaboration in copyright. Specifically, we will
show that while collaborations are naturally conceived of as a challenge along the axis of owners, a solution can be found along the axis
of rights.
Let us begin by describing the three dimensions of property more
carefully. We start with the dimension of owners.190 The number of
owners can vary from one to infinity, and indeed many real-world assets are owned by multiple owners. Nonetheless, property luminaries
such as William Blackstone,191 and years later Harold Demsetz,192
built their understandings of property on simplified single owner
models, and for good reason.193 When an asset has only one owner,
the owner bears and receives, for the most part, the full marginal costs
and benefits of her decisions concerning the asset’s management and
186

Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 698.
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 1126, 1129
(2009) (citations omitted).
188
See id. at 1137–38.
189
Bell & Parchomovsky I, supra note 175, at 1015.
190
See id. at 1022 (stating the three dimensions of property as owner, asset, and
dominion).
191
See id. at 1015; Anna di Robilant, Property: A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree?, 66 VAND. L.
REV. 869, 877 (2013) (“Blackstone’s widely cited assertion that property is ‘that sole and
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the
world in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe’ brought [the
ownership] model to fame.”).
192
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967).
193
See Bell & Parchomovsky I, supra note 175, at 1015 (stating that Blackstone described the ideal number of owners in the optimal dominion as one); Demsetz, supra note
192, at 350, 354–56 (proposing that property rights develop to internalize externalities and
that between the two idealized forms of ownership, communal ownership and private ownership, private ownership of land will internalize many of the external costs associated with
communal ownership).

R
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sale.194 Consequently, a single owner is often motivated to make optimal decisions where multiple owners may not.195 Why, then, do assets
often have multiple owners?196 Scholars such as Francesco Parisi197
and Ben Depoorter198 have powerfully demonstrated that over time
property rights tend to fragment.199 The most basic mechanism by
which fragmentation occurs is inheritance.200 Alice may own Blackacre as a single owner for her entire life. Upon her death, however, it
is likely that her right will pass to more than one heir or devisee. As
the number of transfers grows, the number of rightsholders increases
as well, and with it the potential for conflicts. The same is true, of
course, of expressive works. As we explained above,201 copyright law
recognizes the possibility of more than one owner.202 Furthermore,
since copyright protection lasts for seventy years past the life of the
author, ownership in copyrights is almost certain to pass through several generations, leading to a high likelihood of fragmentation.203
The second dimension of property policy is assets, and, more specifically, the configuration of assets.204 Consider tangible assets first.
The physical dimensions of assets can be modified in response to
changing social preferences. For example, a large tract of land may
be repeatedly subdivided or combined with neighboring parcels. Naturally, the optimal size varies over time as the land is put to different
uses. In an agricultural society the optimal tract size is likely larger
194
See Demsetz, supra note 192, at 356 (asserting that private ownership concentrates
the benefits and costs onto the private owner).
195
See id. at 356–57 (contrasting the communal owners and private owners’ incentives
to economic externalities).
196
Barzel takes the position that assets often have multiple owners. See YORAM BARZEL,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 6 (2d ed. 1997). This is due to Barzel’s economic,
rather than legal, definition of ownership as the ability to extract value from an asset. See
id. at 4–5.
197
Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 595 (2002); Francesco Parisi,
The Fall and Rise of Functional Property 1, 10–11 (George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Law &
Econ., Working Paper No. 05-38, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=850565.
198
Ben W.F. Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fragmentation of Property Rights: A Functional
Interpretation of the Law of Servitudes 1, 18–20 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ., &
Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. 284, 2003), available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.
edu/lepp_papers/284.
199
See id. at 18 (explaining how the free creation of servitudes leads to the partitioning
of property rights).
200
See id.
201
Supra Part I.A.
202
Supra Part I.A.1.b–c.
203
See Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries of
Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 44, 55 (2004). Indeed, the statute actually
requires passing along certain rights to successors in interest in ways that are certain to
lead to fragmentation. Consider, for example, the law’s treatment of termination. In this
context, see Guy A. Rub, Stronger than Kryptonite? Inalienable Profit-Sharing Schemes in Copyright Law, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 74–75 (2013).
204
See Bell & Parchomovsky I, supra note 175, at 1022.
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than in an urban society.205 But size is not the only facet of an asset
subject to change: there are other asset characteristics that can be
bundled together or kept separate. Common interest communities
are a case in point. Common interest communities offer a mix of private residential units and shared amenities.206 By bundling together
private units and shared amenities, common interest communities offer dwellers an especially attractive combination of asset traits as is
evidenced by the growing popularity of this property form.207 In a
similar vein, buildings in large metropolitan areas often combine residential and commercial uses in order to maximize the value of the
asset. Asset configuration plays an even bigger role in the case of chattels. Compare older generation cellular phones to more modern
smart phones. Originally, cellular phones were a single-purpose communication device. Today, they are much closer to personal portable
computers with multiple communication capabilities.208
Intangible goods, such as copyrights and patents, can be even
more readily reconfigured. At present the underlying asset protected
by copyright law is an original expression.209 Protection does not extend to the ideas.210 One could easily imagine, however, a legal system that affords protection to ideas, either on a stand-alone basis211 or
when they are coupled with original expression.212 Moreover, as we
noted earlier, copyright protection applies to the components of a
copyrighted work, even when the work is a seamless whole.213 For instance, a single photograph or greeting card may have various pro205
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1332 (1993) (suggesting
that bigger land parcels can minimize cost for grazing livestock on expansive group-owned
pastures).
206
See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S.
LAW: PROPERTY 146 (2010).
207
See id. at 150 (“[I]n many states today, more than one-half of new residential construction is organized in [common interest communities].”); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1183 (1999) (“Common-interest
communities . . . are perhaps the most significant form of social reorganization of late
twentieth-century America.”).
208
Jennifer Lynn, The Growing Smartphone Popularity Among Retail Consumers, DROID
REP. (May 15, 2014, 11:59 AM), http://www.droidreport.com/growing-smartphone-popu
larity-among-retail-consumers-9654.
209
See Depoorter, supra note 203, at 53 (“Copyright law protects the expression of
ideas.”).
210
See id.
211
See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Marketplace for Ideas?, 84 TEX. L. REV.
395, 396 (2005) (suggesting that since inventions embody ideas, millions of ideas have
indirectly become the subject of private property).
212
See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Evolution of Private and Open Access
Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 77, 93–95 (2009) [hereinafter Bell & Parchomovsky
II] (recognizing the weaknesses of exclusion-based development of property rights over
expressive content and introducing the open source movement as an attempt to preserve
private rights with greatly diluted owner dominion).
213
Supra Part I.A.1.c.
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tected component elements, such as an overall “look and feel.”214
The divisibility of copyrighted works is particularly striking when the
expressive goods consist of multiple contributions, such as software,
films, or even literary works. The law can grant protection to each
contribution in its own right or only to the combined product of all
the different combinations.215 And, of course, the law may protect
both the components and the work as a whole.216
The third and final dimension of property is rights, or dominion.217 The scope of rights that attend property runs the gamut from
a mere license to use an asset in a particular way all the way to full
unfettered ownership of the asset with all relevant attendant powers.218 In an oft-cited statement, William Blackstone famously described property as “the sole and despotic dominion which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”219 But
as many modern property rights theorists have shown, nothing in the
definition of property rights implies full exclusion of others.220 In reality, property regimes vacillate between the diodes of exclusion and
management.221 Some property doctrines, such as trespass, focus on
exclusion, whereas others, such as nuisance, are designed around
management regimes that do not involve exclusionary powers.222
Management regimes typically confer upon the relevant rightsholders
214
See, e.g., Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir.
1970) (“total concept and feel” protected); Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d
444, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“creation of the subject” protectable).
215
Supra Part I.A.1.b–c.
216
Supra Part I.A.1.b–c.
217
See Bell & Parchomovsky I, supra note 175, at 1022.
218
See id. at 1030–31 (discussing property rights as a function of the three dimensions
of ownership, asset configuration, and owner dominion which can be redefined at the
request of property consumers, including constituents and lobbyists).
219
Id. at 1015.
220
See id. at 1015, 1023 (explaining that the Blackstonian ideal which includes total
exclusion rights serves as the idealized goal of property definition but has proved an inaccurate reference point for property theorists).
221
See Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 1855–56
(2012); Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, Conflicts in Property, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
37, 41 (2005); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L.
REV. 965, 974–75 (2004) [hereinafter Exclusion and Property Rules]; Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453,
454–55 (2002) [hereinafter Exclusion Versus Governance] (“[R]ights fall on a spectrum between the poles of exclusion and governance.”).
222
See Dagan & Heller, supra note 221, at 40–41 (asserting that although the doctrinal
home for property conflicts is trespass law if property is about exclusion, governance typifies property at least as much as exclusion does); Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note
221, at 992–93 (asserting that trespass is an exclusion regime while nuisance partakes both
of an exclusionary and governance-like aspect); Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 221,
at 455 (asserting that nuisance law reflects governance strategy compared to trespass and
property law).
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various use rights that may be exercised subject to the rights of others,
without granting any party full dominion over the relevant asset.223
Other property regimes, such as time shares, involve partial exclusion
powers, allowing each rightsholder to have full dominion of the asset,
but only for a limited time.224
Insofar as dominion, or scope of rights, is concerned, intellectual
property law offers an especially impressive range of permutations. Although the statutory default is to grant owners the full panoply of
rights, owners have the power to reduce the scope of protection.225
Organizations such as the Creative Commons offer copyright owners a
menu of default settings that allows them to choose different packages
of protection, all of which represent less protection relative to the
scope of rights granted to them under the Copyright Act.226 Similarly,
in the patent context, scholars have proposed various alternative formulations of patent grants, proposing the enactment of “quasi-patents” that would avail only against direct competitors,227 “research
patents” for incomplete inventions,228 and “null patents” for failed inventions.229 In a recent paper, we offered a detailed blueprint for a
bottom-up design of copyright and patent protection that allows rightsholders to tailor the level of protection to their individual needs.230
It should be evident that copyright is as open to three-dimensional solutions as any other field of property. Given the great
amount of flexibility in shaping owner, asset, and dominion,
lawmakers and judges can resolve problems along any of the three
axes. Yet, in the case of multiple contributions to copyrighted works,
223
See Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note 221, at 979 (characterizing the governance strategy as one in which rights are delineated using signals that pick out and protect
individual uses and user behavior).
224
See Bell & Parchomovsky I, supra note 175, at 1022 n.31.
225
Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1302–03 (1996) (suggesting that the property rule entitlements granted at the outset actually lead to a liability rule-like regime
because members, and not the government, determine the menu of terms).
226
See Lydia Pallas Loren, Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: Enforcement
of Creative Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV.
271, 296–97 (2007) (describing how a copyright owner could opt to retain all private rights
that the Copyright Act grants him, dedicate his work to the public domain, or place his
work within the semicommons provided by the Creative Commons); Robert P. Merges, A
New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 199 (2004) (“The various Creative Commons licenses can thus be seen as a menu of waiver options from which creators
themselves can select.”).
227
Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, Partial Patents, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 207,
208 (2011).
228
Dmitry Karshtedt, The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law, 56 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
229
Sean B. Seymore, The Null Patent, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2041, 2062 (2012).
230
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reinventing Copyright and Patent, 113 MICH.
L. REV. 231 (2014).
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legislators and judges to date have focused their efforts on only two of
the three dimensions: the number of owners and the configuration of
the asset.231 The third dimension—the scope of rights—has been
completely neglected.
The two cases of Aalmuhammed 232 and Tasini 233 provide a perfect
illustration. In Aalmuhammed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
viewed the case through the narrow prism of number of owners.234
The issue at hand was whether to recognize Aalmuhammed as a
coowner of the copyright in the film and thereby increase the number
of owners from one to two.235 Adhering to the default preference for
a single owner, the court denied Aalmuhammed’s claim to a copyright
in the film, even though it was agreed by all parties that he met the
prerequisites of copyrightable contribution and intent.236
In Tasini, the court took a different route. The Tasini decision is
all about asset configuration.237 Instead of treating the digitized content of the New York Times daily editions as a unified collective work,
the Court agreed that the contributions of the appellants, freelance
journalists who wrote articles for the newspaper, should be spliced off
from the rest of the paper content and accorded independent copyright protection on a free-standing basis.238 In our terminology, the
majority in Tasini redefined the asset by breaking up the digitized versions of the Times into two categories of independently copyrightable
modules: content produced by employees of the New York Times and
the content produced by freelance journalists. The copyright in the
former was held by the New York Times based on the
work-made-for-hire doctrine, whereas the copyright in the latter was
held by the individual contributors, and could only be used by the
Times in accordance with a restrictive license.239
231

See infra notes 232–245 and accompanying text.
Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000).
233
N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
234
See Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1232 (analyzing whether Aalmuhammed qualifies as
a coauthor).
235
See id. at 1230.
236
See id. at 1235 (concluding that although Aalmuhammed made very valuable contributions to the movie, that was not enough for coauthorship of a joint work).
237
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 487–88 (discussing the distinction between copyright in each
separate contribution to a collective work and copyright in the collective work as a whole).
238
See id. at 488 (holding that the print publishers and the electronic publishers infringed the copyrights of the freelance authors because the databases in question did not
reproduce and distribute articles standing alone in context, as part of a collective work to
which the author contributed, as part of any revision thereof, or as part of any later collective work in the same series).
239
See id. at 498 & n.7 (holding that the freelance authors hold undisputed copyrights
in the articles, and that the publishers would not have qualified as authors under the
works-made-for-hire doctrine because the freelance authors were neither “employees” nor
“commissioned” by the publishers through “a written instrument signed by both parties”
indicating that the articles shall be considered “works made for hire”).
232
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Both the Aalmuhammed court and the Tasini court appealed to
property theory for help with the challenge at hand. Unfortunately,
neither court saw the full picture. The Aalmuhammed court was worried in part that raising the number of owners above one would create
a commons problem that may lead to value dissipation.240 The court
feared that giving Aalmuhammed a copyright in the movie would turn
him into a coequal owner with the movie studio with the same use
rights and exclusionary powers.241 It therefore decided to deny his
ownership claim.242
The Tasini court faced an opposite challenge. It sought a way to
give the free-lance journalists who made contributions to the New York
Times a second bite of the apple. The Court vindicated their separate
copyrights and imposed a restrictive interpretation on the mandatory
collective work license that accompanied the publication of their articles in a newspaper.243 The Court was clearly of the opinion that this
result is desirable from a distributive standpoint and would reinforce
initial incentives to create.244 Hence, the Court separated the freelancers’ contributions from the rest of the journalistic content, bestowing a sole-owner status on each of the freelancers with respect to
subsequent uses of the contributions outside of the print edition of
the New York Times.245 Unfortunately, the decision opened a Pandora’s box by giving contributors to collective works the ability to
block subsequent uses of the content contemplated by the compiler of
the collective content. From a property perspective, the Tasini court
created an anticommons problem that property policymakers typically
strive to avoid.
Both courts erred in overlooking the third dimension of scope of
rights in forming their decisions. The Aalmuhammed court could have
recognized a more limited set of rights than a full-fledged set of copyright rights described in section 106 of the Copyright Act.246 The
court did not have to give Aalmuhammed the power to authorize distribution of the film or the right to make derivative works. Instead, it
could have given him a right to a certain percentage of the proceeds
from the movie. Similarly, the Tasini court did not have to give such a
narrow interpretation to the collective work license as to effectively
splice off the freelancers’ parts from the journalistic content as a
whole. Rather, the Court could have granted the freelancers a limited
right to royalties, which was precisely what they sought.
240
241
242
243
244
245
246

Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1235.
See id.
Id. at 1236.
Tasini, 533 U.S. at 488.
See id. at 501–03.
See id. at 504–06.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
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Copyright law’s conception of the rights of joint authors is taken
directly from property law’s rules on tenancy in common.247 Each
owner has an undivided right in the whole that can be transferred and
otherwise exercised without limitation, subject only to the duty to account for profits to other owners.248 But this allocation of rights
among owners is just one of many possible ways to define property
rights. There are many property forms that allocate rights unequally
among owners. For instance, where ownership of an asset is divided
among present and future interest holders, only the present interest
owners have a current right of possession,249 while future interest owners must suffice with exercising their rights to block “waste” of the
asset.250
3. Trusts
Of particular interest to us is the instrument of trust. The creation of a trust results in the bifurcation of ownership into a legal interest and an equitable interest.251 The creator, or settlor, of the trust
transfers her title to a trustee, who thereupon becomes the owner of
the legal title.252 At the same time, however, the creator appoints beneficiaries, vesting in them an equitable title to the benefits to be accrued from the assets or money that were put in trust.253 The settlor
may spell out the rights of the beneficiaries and duties of the trustees
in an instrument of trust.254 However, the law also imposes a
mandatory relationship between trustee and beneficiary: trustees owe
a fiduciary duty to manage the trust assets for the benefit of the beneficiaries with a high degree of fidelity.255 One of the primary purposes
of the unique ownership structure engendered by trusts is to ensure
superior management of assets by concentrating all management decisions in the hands of managers who possess the requisite expertise for
the task, while, at the same time, securing the benefit of that expertise
for the individuals or entities whom the settlor of the trust held
247

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976); Kwall, supra note 173, at 57.
Julie Katzman, Note, Joint Authorship of Commissioned Works, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 867,
875 (1989).
249
See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property, and Positive Externalities, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 226 (2012).
250
See Lydia Pallas Loren, Abandoning the Orphans: An Open Access Approach to Hostage
Works, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1431, 1449–50 (2012); Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra
note 249, at 226; Deepa Varadarajan, Improvement Doctrines, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 657, 671
(2014).
251
Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 643, 653 (2014).
252
Id. at 658.
253
Id. at 653–54.
254
See id.
255
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 543 (2014).
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dear.256 The beneficiaries, in other words, are entitled to receive the
residual benefit arising from the trust.257
The separation of legal and equitable ownership has many advantages—it concentrates all assets in the hands of a single owner, it guarantees superior management of the trust funds, it carries out the will
of the settlor, and guarantees a stream of income to the beneficiaries—but it also has an obvious downside: it gives rise to an agency
problem. Although the trustee is remunerated for her labor, there is
always a risk that she might try to increase her reward at the expense
of the beneficiaries, either by shirking on her duties or by diverting
funds from the beneficiaries to herself. To address this problem, the
law imposes a fiduciary duty on the trustee to act in good faith to
further the interests of the beneficiaries in accordance with the terms
of the trust instrument.258 Breach of the duty allows the settlor and
the beneficiary to seek redress against the trustee.259
As we shall show, adapting the trust to the needs of collaborative
copyright works can provide an alternative ownership structure that
better meets the needs of contributors to collaborative works as well as
the interests of society in production and exploitation of creative
works of expression.260
B. Corporate Law
A second source of guidance for our proposal comes from corporate law.
Corporations, by their very design, embody the ideal of separation of ownership and control. By recognizing corporations as legal
entities, corporate law enables the concentration of all corporate assets in the hands of a fictional single owner, namely the corporation
itself.261 The corporation, in turn, may be owned by one or multiple
owners who receive shares of the enterprise.262 The shareholders, qua
shareholders, do not run the daily operations of the corporate entity.263 Rather, they appoint a board of directors that, in turn, elects a
256
John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625,
637–38 (1995); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
621, 633–34 (2004).
257
Sitkoff, supra note 256, at 646–47.
258
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., supra note 255, § 543.
259
Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 767, 776–77 (2000); Sitkoff, supra note 256, at 679–80; Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law,
Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 565, 572–73 (2003).
260
Infra Part II.C.
261
John Armour et al., The Essential Elements of Corporate Law: What Is Corporate Law? 1,
6 (Discussion Paper No. 643, 2009), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/
olin_center/papers/pdf/Kraakman_643.pdf.
262
Id. at 11.
263
Id. at 12.
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management for the corporation.264 The board of directors not only
selects the officers of the corporation but also determines their compensation.265 The shareholders’ ownership is thus reduced, in practice, to a right to profits from the enterprise while control is shared
among directors and managers.266
The structure of corporations gives rise to several conflicts of interest, or agency costs. The first, and most famous one, is between the
management and the shareholders.267 The division of management
and control raises the specter that the management might act to enhance its narrow self-interests at the expense of the shareholders.268
For example, the management can increase its compensation, hire
friends and relatives, shirk on the job, or engage in “empire building”—practices that increase the size of the corporation, as opposed
to its profits.269 The second conflict of interest in this is between
bondholders and shareholders. Both groups have a claim to the corporate profits, but while the claim of the bondholders is fixed (or invariant) and is determined in advance, the payoff to the shareholders
depends on the amount of the corporate profits.270 Thus, shareholders typically prefer to see the corporation take on more risk that bondholders would rather avoid.271 Finally, there is a conflict of interest
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. The
concern, in this case, is that the controlling shareholders may take
advantage of their power to obtain private benefits from the corporation through self-dealing. For example, the controllers may direct the
corporation to sell corporate assets below market price to other companies the controllers own.272
Corporate law employs a wide array of strategies to minimize
those costs. The officers of the corporation owe a duty of care and a
duty of loyalty to the corporation, which puts them under a legal obligation to do the best they can to further the interests of the shareholders.273 Furthermore, the management is subject to constant
264

Id.
Matthew Farrell, Note, A Role for the Judiciary in Reforming Executive Compensation: The
Implications of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Bank of America Corp., 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 169, 173 (2010).
266
Bell & Parchomovsky I, supra note 175, at 1045–46.
267
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 71–72 (2003).
268
See id.
269
See id. at 72.
270
Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of
Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118–19 (1979).
271
Id.
272
David M.W. Harvey, Bondholders’ Rights and the Case for a Fiduciary Duty, 65 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 1023, 1031 (1991).
273
Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009).
265
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monitoring from the board of directors.274 The directors, too, owe a
fiduciary duty to the shareholders (or, more precisely, to the corporation).275 Furthermore, the shareholders can appoint their representation on the board of directors.276 Of course, shareholders can also
protect themselves from managerial abuse in any single corporation
by diversifying their portfolio of investments.277
To secure bondholders (and other creditors) against excessive
risk, a wide array of contractual measures is employed to constrain the
ability of the shareholders to engage in risky investments.278 Finally,
the law imposes various restrictions on self-dealing and incorporates
various protections of minority shareholders to address the potential
for abuse by controlling shareholders.279
Despite the various agency costs inherent to corporate structures,
the separation of management and ownership in corporations gives
rise to important advantages. First of all, by separating capital from
management, it allows individuals with strong managerial skills to put
their talents at the service of capital owners.280 In addition, corporations enable capital owners with different risk preferences to take different stakes in corporations in accordance with their risk
preferences.281 For example, risk-seeking individuals can invest in
shares and even options, while risk-averse individuals can become
bondholders. Finally, as Ronald Coase famously pointed out, corporations offer a superior alternative to market transactions when transaction costs are high.282 Coase observed that production of goods or
services falls into one of two paradigms: markets and corporations.283
Markets operate on the basis of voluntary exchange via contracts.284
They can allocate resources to their highest-value users when transaction costs are sufficiently low.285 When transaction costs are high,
274
James D. Cox & Nis Jul Clausen, The Monitoring Duties of Directors Under the EC Directives: A View from the United States Experience, 2 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 29, 31 (1992);
George W. Dent, Jr., The Revolution in Corporate Governance, the Monitoring Board, and the
Director’s Duty of Care, 61 B.U. L. REV. 623, 623 (1981).
275
Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
457, 464 (2009); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Structural Bias,
32 J. CORP. L. 833, 835 (2007).
276
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Director Nominations, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 117, 118 (2014).
277
Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99,
108, 111–12 (1989).
278
Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 301, 302–03 (1983).
279
See Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 393, 401–08 (2003).
280
Fama & Jensen, supra note 278, at 315.
281
Kusner v. First Pa. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 276, 282 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
282
R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390–92 (1937).
283
See id. at 387–89.
284
See id. at 390–91.
285
Id. at 389.
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however, markets will not operate optimally as a mechanism for resource allocation.286 Corporations, on the other hand, are hierarchical structures where decisions are made by managerial fiat.287 In
other words, production and allocation decisions within corporations
do not require consent, and hence, they are not affected by market
transaction costs.288
As a rule, decisions within corporations are made by the management and do not require approval from the board or the general assembly of shareholders.289 In fact, shareholders are not involved in
the day-to-day management of the corporation. Their input is required only in exceptional cases, such as amendment of the corporate
articles or bylaws, approval of mergers and acquisitions, and the sale
of assets.290 Typically, decisions are made by a simple majority.291
However, in special cases, such as sale of assets, the law imposes a
super-majority requirement.292 In even more extreme cases in which
self-dealing is involved, the law imposes a requirement for a
majority-of-a-minority approval.293 The structures and rules of corporate law inform our proposal for reforming copyright law.294
Before moving on to our own proposal, we should take notice of
a different perspective on the insights corporations can give us into
collaborative production of copyrighted works. In a recent important
contribution,295 Anthony Casey and Andreas Sawicki look to the theoretical literature on industrial organization and on the allocation of
rights within firms, pioneered by Ronald Coase296 and developed by
Oliver Williamson,297 Oliver Hart,298 and Armen Alchian and Harold
Demsetz,299 to explain and criticize current law regarding copyright
286

Id. at 390–91.
See id.
288
Id. at 391.
289
See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 251 (1999) (describing management’s virtually absolute control
over a corporation’s internal matters).
290
See id. at 311; Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 407, 418 (2006).
291
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395, 400 (1983).
292
See id. at 399.
293
Goshen, supra note 279, at 402.
294
See generally Zohar Goshen, Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule or Liability Rule?,
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 741, 748 n.20 (1997) (explaining the various majority requirements in
corporate law within the Calabresi-Melamedian property-liability rules framework).
295
See Casey & Sawicki, supra note 3, at 1687.
296
See Coase, supra note 282, at 389.
297
Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 113–14 (1971).
298
OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 56–61 (1995).
299
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 785–95 (1972).
287
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ownership. Casey and Sawicki do not focus on doctrines in corporate
law.300 Rather, they aim to utilize the theoretical insights in other
fields to devise a framework for determining how copyright doctrines
affect the organizational framework in which copyrighted works are
produced.301
Beginning with the observation that firms are hierarchical organizations, Casey and Sawicki note that production within firms predominantly relies on managerial command and control.302 The
decision-making power in firms is held by the management.303 The
management is charged with allocating tasks among employees, assessing and monitoring their performance, and rewarding and penalizing
performance.304 Building on the firm analogy, Casey and Sawicki argue for the importance of concentrating ownership and control in the
hands of the single person or entity that can best supervise the creative process and its inputs.305 While Casey and Sawicki acknowledge
that different ownership regimes are appropriate for different modes
of production of intellectual products, they call for the use of broad,
derivate works rights and the work-made-for-hire doctrine when the
law wishes to encourage collaborative cooperation.306 Noting that
both doctrines concentrate ownership and control in the hands of a
single person or entity, Casey and Sawicki argue that wider use of the
doctrines would improve ex ante incentives to create and minimize
strategic problems ex post.307
Although we share Casey and Sawicki’s concerns and we draw inspiration from many of the same theoretical sources, we arrive at a
radically different conclusion. We propose a policy solution that, to a
large degree, may be viewed as antithetical to those espoused by Casey
and Sawicki.
C. Copyright Trusts
In this subpart, we propose a new copyright structure that courts
would be able to apply, at their discretion, to resolve disputes concerning works consisting of multiple contributions. Before delving into
the details of our proposal, it is important to emphasize two things.
First, the regime we propose would be judicially administered and not
reliant upon statutory amendments. It therefore would add to, rather
than replace, the existing regimes. Courts would be at liberty in
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Casey & Sawicki, supra note 3, at 1690.
id.
id. at 1695–99.
id. at 1708–09.
id. at 1695–96.
id. at 1702.
id. at 1721–22, 1727.
id. at 1693, 1723–26, 1729–35.
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appropriate cases to apply the doctrines of work made for hire, implied license, joint ownership, and the other rules we discussed earlier.308 Our goal is to add another instrument to the toolkit of
copyright lawmakers—one which, we argue, provides an ownership
structure that better meets the needs of incentivizing production and
promoting optimal exploitation of creative works. Second, and relatedly, our proposed framework is open to contributors as a contractual
choice. Collaborators could choose to contract in advance into our
proposed structure; after the fact, of course, courts could still impose
the structure by judicial decision in the absence of a contractual
arrangement.
Our framework is designed to allow courts to achieve a more equitable and efficient resolution of disputes concerning rights in works
resulting from multiple contributions. As in trust and corporate structures, at the core of our proposal lies the idea of separation between
ownership and control. In our view, a work may have multiple owners, but only one among them should have the power to make decisions about its economic exploitation.309 All other owners would be
entitled to monetary remuneration but would lack managerial power.
The owner with the decision-making power would be called
“owner-trustee.” The other owners would be termed “owner-beneficiaries.” The chosen terminology is not accidental. Similar to trust
structures, the owner-trustee would owe a fiduciary duty to the ownerbeneficiaries and would have to act in good faith to further their interests. Furthermore, our proposal incorporates various mechanisms to
prevent the owner-trustee from enriching herself at the expense of
the beneficiary-owners. Some of the protections we provide are taken
from standard property law. For instance, owner beneficiaries would
have the power to bring an action for accounting against the
owner-trustee, as well as sue for waste.310 Other defenses are taken
from corporate law and include restrictions on self-dealing and on
other forms of “tunneling” (i.e., transactions intended to transfer
wealth from the owner-beneficiaries to the owner-trustee or her
relatives).311
308

See supra Part I.
Our view echoes what Robert Merges wrote about how to approach useful knowledge held by traditional communities. Merges noted that in such cases, the traditional
leaders of the group represent the entire community and protect the interests of its individual members. Merges suggests that “[w]hat is needed in cases of dispersed creativity is
to identify similar representative people or entities.” Merges, supra note 3, at 1190.
310
For descriptions of the accounting and waste remedies, see GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., supra note 255, §§ 861, 967.
311
For a description of laws of self-dealing and “tunneling,” see Vladimir Atanasov et
al., Law and Tunneling, 37 J. CORP. L. 1, 2–3 (2011); Charles Bryan Baron, Self-Dealing Trustees and the Exoneration Clause: Can Trustees Ever Profit from Transactions Involving Trust Property?, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 43, 45–57 (1998).
309

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-5\CRN501.txt

1056

unknown

Seq: 42

12-JUN-15

12:29

[Vol. 100:1015

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

Interestingly, the Copyright Act already contains a reference to
“beneficial ownership.” According to section 501 of the Copyright
Act, the “beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is
entitled . . . to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right . . . .”312 While “beneficial owner” is not defined by the Act,
Nimmer’s treatise acknowledges that “[p]resumably, reference is intended to the general law of trusts.”313 Courts have utilized the concept of “beneficial ownership” in relation to the narrow question
addressed by section 501, namely when nonowners have the right to
bring suit. In particular, courts have generally held that “an author
who assigns his legal rights to a work in exchange for royalties from its
exploitation has a beneficial interest sufficient for statutory standing
under § 501(b).”314 Our proposal would take the concept of beneficial ownership and apply it more generally to questions of copyright
ownership.
To operationalize our proposal, a court would have to make two
decisions. First, it would have to decide whom, among the various
contributors, to appoint an owner-trustee. As a rule, the owner-trustee should be the individual or entity that added the most value to the
work and therefore has the highest economic stake in the success of
the work. In some special cases, the court may assign the role of an
owner-trustee to a smaller contributor if she has special managerial
skills or is uniquely positioned to exploit the work commercially.
Often, the decision whom to appoint an owner-trustee would be
rather straightforward. In a case like Aalmuhammed,315 for example, it
is clear that the movie studio should be considered the owner-trustee.
The movie studio, Warner Brothers, not only made a much greater
investment in the work, but also has vastly superior experience than
Aalmuhammed in the promotion of movies. At other times, though,
the choice may be more difficult. But our framework is flexible
enough to accommodate even those cases.
The second decision a court would have to make is how to divide
ownership shares among the various contributors involved. The ownership shares (whether trustee-owner or beneficial-owner), in turn,
would determine the financial rewards of each contributor. For example, if the court were to decide that a certain contributor is entitled
to a thirty percent ownership share, she would be entitled to receive
thirty percent of the proceeds generated by the work. In determining
the ownership share, the court would take into account the relative
312
313

17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2012).
3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER

ON

COPYRIGHT § 12.02 (rev. ed.

2012).
314
315

Smith v. Casey, 741 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2014).
Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000).
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contribution of each of the parties to the final product. Once again
we will use the facts of Aalmuhammed to illustrate how this should
work. Although Aalmuhammed clearly contributed to the movie, his
contribution was a small part of the final product. Aalmuhammed
made a few small conceptual contributions to the movie—for example, he introduced several small changes to the script to make depictions of Muslim prayer more authentic.316 Yet, it is clear that
Aalmuhammed was not the mastermind of the movie. He did not
contribute to the overall plot or to many other aspects of the movie as
a whole. Given that Aalmuhammed did not come up with the concept
of the movie, did not direct it or produce it, and that his contributions
were relatively minor both in terms of importance and scope, his ownership stake should probably be less than one percent. While a fraction of a percent is a relatively small ownership stake, it must be kept
in mind that the movie grossed nearly $50 million.317
Once a court selected the owner-trustee and assigns ownership
shares to all the parties involved, the owner-trustee would have sole
discretion as to how to manage the work in order to maximize its
value for all the owners. The main right of the beneficiary-owners
would be to receive a prorated share, commensurate with their ownership interests from the proceeds generated from the work. Nonetheless, if the owner-trustee failed to act in good faith to further this goal,
the owner-beneficiaries would have the power to commence legal action to compel the owner-trustee to undertake different courses of
action. For instance, the owner-beneficiaries would be able to sue the
owner-trustee for waste if she were to destroy the work (or copies
thereof) or engage in other practices that depleted the value of the
work. To prevent frivolous suits, we propose that courts adopt the
business judgment rule in adjudicating suits against owner-trustees.318
The business judgment rule, while respecting decisionmakers’ fiduciary duties, also grants decisionmakers a high degree of deference in
exercising their judgment regarding commercial matters.319 This
standard of review would strike the right balance between the interests
of the parties. On the one hand, it would give the owner-trustee sufficient elbow room to operate. On the other hand, it would provide the
316

See id. at 1230.
Malcolm X, BOX OFF. MOJO, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=malcolmx
.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2015).
318
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57
VAND. L. REV. 83, 88 (2004).
319
See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 n.17 (Del.
1994) (stating that the business judgment rule permits the court to accord “great deference to the substance of the directors’ decision” and “not invalidate the decision [or]
examine its reasonableness”); Ralph A. Peeples, The Use and Misuse of the Business Judgment
Rule in the Close Corporation, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 456, 457 (1985).
317
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owner-beneficiaries protection against bad faith acts of mismanagement and intentional abuse.
As in the context of trusts and corporations, the owner-trustee’s
fiduciary duties would give owner-beneficiaries legal causes of action.
The owner-beneficiaries would be able to block the owner-trustee
from engaging in self-dealing, for example.320 To illustrate,
owner-beneficiaries would be able to obtain an injunction against the
owner-trustee should she attempt to license the work to another company she owns at a submarket price. However, they would not be able
to block standard licensing transactions and would not have the right
to file for partition of the work—either by sale or in kind.321
Our proposal offers several important advantages relative to the
existing doctrine. First, in keeping with the constitutional ambition to
encourage the production of original works,322 our proposal guarantees that each contributor would be rewarded proportionately to her
contribution unless the parties contractually agreed otherwise. The
implementation of our proposal preserves the contractual baseline
that characterizes current doctrines, while providing assurance to authors, for whom complete contracting is impractical or inefficient,
that their labor would not go unremunerated. By giving authors an
ownership stake that is commensurate with their contribution, our
proposal enhances both productive efficiency and fairness. As far as
productive efficiency is concerned, our proposal would have a salutary
effect on the creation of expressive works in high transaction cost environments and especially in cases of amateur authors who are not
familiar with the legal intricacies of the Copyright Act.
The second advantage of our proposal is that it improves the use
and commercial exploitation of collaborative works after their creation. Our proposal largely takes away the power of individual contributors to veto uses of collaborative works or to deplete works of all
commercial value by splicing off their contribution from the rest of
the work.323 Relative to its doctrinal alternatives, our framework only
minimally relies on property rule protections in the form of injunctions and employs instead, liability rule protection in the form of

320

Baron, supra note 311, at 43.
For descriptions of owners’ rights to partition, see Flood v. Kalinyaprak, 2004 MT
15, 84 P.3d 27, 32 (Mont. 2004); Jaffe, supra note 3, at 1564 n.99. Functionally, the court’s
ruling in Garcia v. Google, Inc. gave Garcia a right to partition the film in kind. 766 F.3d 929
(9th Cir. 2014), reh’g on banc granted, 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2014). This would not be
possible under our proposal.
322
Michael B. Gerdes, Comment, Getting Beyond Constitutionally Mandated Originality as
a Prerequisite for Federal Copyright Protection, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1461, 1462 (1992).
323
As we noted supra Part II.A.1, separating works into component parts essentially
creates anticommons likely to undermine productive use of the work.

R

321
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monetary payment to be decided by the court.324 An important beneficiary from our proposal is the general public who will not be adversely affected by conflicts among authors.
Third, and finally, our proposal has the potential to reduce adjudicative costs. Admittedly, the implementation of our proposal requires judicial action. We are also cognizant of the fact that the two
determinations courts would need to make—appointing an
owner-trustee and determining the ownership stakes of all contributors—may not always be straightforward. That said, it must be borne
in mind that our proposal is meant as a supplement, not a replacement, to existing doctrines. We do not argue that it should be administered in all cases. Quite the contrary, we contend that our solution
should be reserved to those cases in which it can be administered at a
sufficiently low cost. Specifically, courts should turn to our solution
when the owner-trustee is easily identifiable and the ownership stakes
of the parties can be cheaply determined. When these conditions obtain, our proposal holds the promise of economizing on judicial resources. Obviously, this is also an important limitation on our
proposal: when the twin determinations necessary to operationalize
our proposal cannot be made cost effectively, courts would be well
advised to turn to other alternatives.
III
OBJECTIONS
In this Part we anticipate and address four potential objections to
our proposal. The first one consists of the argument that all rights
(and disagreements) concerning the allocation of rights in collaborative works should be resolved contractually. The second objection is
that courts are ill fitted to assess the relative contributions of contributors to collaborative works. The third objection is that current doctrine cannot accommodate our proposal and therefore it cannot be
implemented without legislative reform. The fourth and final objection is that our proposal is incomplete and cannot resolve all collaboration problems. We address each of the four objections in turn and
show that none of them presents an insurmountable challenge to our
proposal.
A. The Contractual Perspective
At the heart of the contractual objection lies the idea that private
ordering via contracts should control the allocation of rights in
324
For a discussion of the distinction between property-rule and liability-rule protection, see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715–16 (1996).
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collaborative works. The theoretical foundation of this idea can be
traced back to the Coase theorem. In his seminal, The Problem of Social
Cost, Roland Coase demonstrated that in a world without transaction
costs, contracts would lead to allocative efficiency irrespective of the
law.325 Subsequent law and economics writers have pushed Coase’s
core insight further and argued for the primacy of contracts (or markets) as the policy instrument of choice as long as transaction costs are
not prohibitive.326 Several contract theorists have even called for the
adoption of penalty defaults—i.e., statutory gap-fillers that diverge the
arrangements the parties would have selected for themselves had they
contracted—in order to encourage parties to reach ex ante agreements that determine their rights and duties vis-à-vis one another.327
In keeping with this approach, one may argue that because our framework would allow courts to reach efficient and equitable results, ex
post, it would undermine the incentive of creators to determine their
rights ex ante.
Our first response to this argument is to remind our readers that
nothing in our proposal denies creators the opportunity to determine
their respective rights contractually. Indeed, as we emphasized,328
courts should defer to the contractual arrangements reached by the
parties and will only be able to use our framework when there is no
agreement among the relevant parties. Second, contracts can only be
relied upon to achieve an efficient allocation of resources when transaction costs are sufficiently low.329 In the case at hand, this condition
does not obtain: transaction costs are often high. To begin with, collaborative works are often created by multiple parties. Multiparty
agreements typically involve higher coordination costs and as the
number of parties grows, so does the likelihood of an impasse. Moreover, contributors to collaborative works are often not familiar with
the intricacies of copyright law and find it prohibitively costly to learn
the doctrinal details. As Professor Robert Ellickson famously established,330 when the cost of learning is high, members of various com325

R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15–17 (1960).
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 93 (6th ed. 2012); FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 90–93
(1991); William Barnett II et al., The Paradox of Coase as a Defender of Free Markets, 1 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 1075, 1078 (2005).
327
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the
Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 624 (1990).
328
Supra Part II.C.
329
Elrik G. Furubotn, General Equilibrium Models, Transaction Costs, and the Concept of
Efficient Allocation in a Capitalist Economy, 147 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 662,
683–84 (1991).
330
Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 685–86 (1986).
326
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munities tend to fall back on social norms and shared
understandings.331 A similar dynamic can be discerned in various creative communities332 where creative processes are governed by what
Ellickson calls a “live and let live” norm.333 In the realm of copyright
law, ignorance of the law runs even deeper than in other fields as
rights in chattels are distinct from the rights in the expressive content
embedded in them.334 For example, when a corporation pays an independent programmer to upgrade a software application for it, the
corporation will typically receive only a license to use the upgraded
version.335 In the absence of an explicit transfer of rights in a written
document, the copyright in the new code will remain the property of
the programmer even though the corporation paid the programmer
for her labor.336 Because they fail to appreciate the nuances of copyright law,337 many creators simply do not know how to craft agreements that govern the production of copyrighted content.
Furthermore, contracts are of limited utility when the subject of
the agreement is nonobservable. As Professor Yochai Benkler338 and
others339 have noted, creative input is a classic example.340 Since creative effort is nonobservable to other parties, it is difficult to draft a
contract that would determine the reward of the creator.341 Where
the reward is determined in advance, creators have an incentive to
shirk.342 Hence, ex ante contracting regarding rights in expressive
content presents a real challenge to the contracting parties and typically involves high transaction costs.343
For all these reasons, private ordering of the regulation of rights
in copyrighted content will almost certainly be incomplete. That said,
we are cognizant of the fact that the adoption of our proposal would
affect ex ante contracting. Empowering courts to determine the
331

Id.
YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 115–16 (2006).
333
Ellickson, supra note 330, at 682.
334
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Alienability and Copyright Law, in CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY
IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 161, 170–73 (Helena R. Howe & Jonathan Griffiths eds.,
2013).
335
Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting Around Statutory
Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93, 100–02 (2006).
336
Id. at 104–07.
337
Stella Brown, Note, It Takes a Village to Make a Difference: Continuing the Spirit of Copyright, 12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 129, 147 (2014).
338
Yochai Benkler & Helen Nissenbaum, Commons-Based Peer Production and Virtue, 14 J.
POL. PHIL. 394, 402–03 (2006).
339
Casey & Sawicki, supra note 3, at 1701–02.
340
Benkler & Nissenbaum, supra note 338, at 402–03; Casey & Sawicki, supra note 3, at
1701–02.
341
Casey & Sawicki, supra note 3, at 1701–02.
342
Id. at 1700 n.64.
343
Id. at 1689, 1695.
332
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rights of the parties, ex post, would invariably affect bargaining positions of the relevant parties vis-à-vis one another and therefore their
incentives to contract.344 Specifically, contributors who believe they
get greater rights in court, under our proposed system, would likely be
more reluctant to determine their rights contractually. Contrariwise,
contributors who believe they would do better at the negotiation table
would try harder to settle the allocation of rights contractually and
avoid litigation. But all this is true only of the actors who go through
the trouble of educating themselves about the law. The behavior of
contributors who don’t know the law and find it prohibitively expensive to educate themselves about it will not modify their behavior.
Their ex ante behavior will not be affected by our proposal.
At the end of the day, then, we recognize that the implementation of our proposal will have an effect on ex ante contracting, but it is
difficult to say, in the abstract, whether it would lead to more or less
contracting and, in any case, we are of the view that the ex post gains
in terms of stronger incentives to create, improved use of collaborative works, and reduction in administrative costs would outweigh the
losses from a possible marginal drop in ex ante contracting.
B. Comparative Merit
A different objection to our proposal targets the core mission we
assign the courts, namely, the need to assess the relative contribution
of the parties to the productive output. One might argue that courts
are ill equipped to determine the respective contributions of the parties and therefore would not be able to decide with sufficient accuracy
their ownership stakes. We believe that this objection is overblown
and therefore should not bar the implementation of our proposal.
The comparative fault revolution in tort law345 proves that courts can
adequately determine contributions to adverse outcomes. There is no
a fortiori reason to think that courts would do worse in determining
contributions to positive outcomes.
This point warrants elaboration. For many centuries the tort system had a binary design.346 Actors were either fully liable for harm
they inflicted on others or fully relieved of responsibility.347 A finding
of no responsibility implied that the loss lied where it fell, or, in other
words, that it was borne by the victim.348 Historically, the option of
apportioning responsibility between the injurer and the victim was not
344

Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 571

(1992).
345
Mary J. Davis, Individual and Institutional Responsibility: A Vision for Comparative Fault
in Products Liability, 39 VILL. L. REV. 281, 294 (1994).
346
Id. at 284–86.
347
Id.
348
Id.
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available to courts.349 Over time, however, policymakers introduced
comparative fault into the tort system.350 Apportioning the blame
among the parties was thought to lead to more equitable results, ex
post,351 without harming ex ante incentives to take care.352 Although
determining the blame of each party can prove tricky at times, comparative fault has become part and parcel of the modern law of tort
and no one seriously calls for its abolition.353
The successful implementation of comparative fault is a good
omen for our proposal. In the typical case, courts will find the task of
determining parties’ contributions to expressive products easier than
determining their comparative fault. Unlike accidents or behaviors
that lead to adverse results, creative processes are usually well documented. This is so for several reasons. First, when parties engage in
harmful activities that are likely to harm others they have an incentive
to destroy evidence that implicates them in such behavior.354 By contrast, when parties produce socially desirable results, as they do when
they create works of authorship, they often may want to make their
contribution known, so they can receive the social recognition they
deserve.355 Second, as far as creative processes are concerned, the
documentation often arises automatically, thanks to modern technology that frequently documents and saves each incremental contribution to the creative process.356 Accordingly, authors have a built-in
incentive to document their artistic achievements in a stable and durable fashion—characteristically, via the creation of copies of their contributions to later be distributed to the public. Third, copyright law
itself requires authors to fix their works in a tangible medium in order
for them to receive copyright protection.357 Hence there is ample reason to believe that courts would be able to rely on a much better evidentiary basis when determining ownership shares in collaborative
work than when apportioning responsibility for harm in tort cases.
349

Id. at 293.
Id. at 294.
351
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Efficiency of Comparative Negligence, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 375,
379–82 (1987).
352
Id. at 382–83.
353
Davis, supra note 345, at 351–52.
354
John Leubsdorf, Evidence Law as a System of Incentives, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1621, 1651
(2010).
355
See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 700 (noting that authors have varied,
“heterogeneous interests,” including at times just wanting “the credit”).
356
See, e.g., Declaration of W. Curtis Preston at 6–7, PB&J Software, LLC v. Code 42
Software, Inc., No. 09-CV-00206, 2011 WL 8333129 (D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2011) (noting that
modern software makes documentation of successive drafts much easier: in “[m]odern
backup systems . . . there are multiple versions of a file, each non-identical version . . . backed-up in its entirety as a separate file,” whereas in the past only one final file
would be saved).
357
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
350
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Moreover, it bears emphasis that courts are already assessing comparative merit (or contributions) in other legal domains. For example, in cases of dissolution of marriage, a large group of states,
including New York and Florida, follows an equitable distribution
model that requires courts to determine, inter alia, the respective contributions of each of the spouses to the acquisition of marital property.358 This determination is far more complex than the one we
expect courts to perform in establishing copyright trusts, as there are
no clear definitions as to what counts as a contribution to married life.
Yet, equitable distribution systems have been at work for several decades.359 Another domain in which courts are required to compare
contributions is that of employee inventions. The laws of several
countries empower courts to allocate rights to inventions developed in
the workplace based on the relative contributions of the employee
and the employer to the patented product or process.360 Obviously
this example is very close to the kinds of tasks courts would have to
undertake to allocate copyright trust rights.
C. Doctrine
A third potential objection to our proposal stems from a more
technical problem. Copyright trusts are not currently employed by
the courts. It might be argued that courts cannot begin creating copyright trusts without new statutory authority.
Of course, we have no objection to lawmakers amending the Copyright Act in order to adopt copyright trusts explicitly within the statute. At the same time, we contend that courts may already adopt our
proposal without any further statutory authority. As we noted,361 the
actual statutory language in the Copyright Act concerning joint authorships is quite limited. The courts, rather than Congress, decided
to adopt the model of tenancy in common for all joint authorships.362
No statute requires using the model in all cases. Likewise, it is the
courts, rather than Congress, that decided how to interpret the term
“author.”363 Case law, not statutory language, imposed the “master
358
Carmen Valle Patel, Note, Treating Professional Goodwill as Marital Property in Equitable Distribution States, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 557 (1983).
359
Elizabeth A. Cheadle, The Development of Sharing Principles in Common Law Marital
Property States, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1269, 1279 (1981).
360
Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 4–6 (1999); see also Vai Io Lo, Employee Inventions and Works for Hire in Japan: A
Comparative Study Against the U.S., Chinese, and German Systems, 16 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J.
279 (2002) (discussing several nation-state examples of these court-empowerment laws).
361
Supra Part I.A.1.b.
362
See Kwall, supra note 173, at 57 (discussing how, like general property, copyright law
tenancy in common doctrine stemmed from judge-made law).
363
See generally id. at 57–59 (discussing the predominant role of courts given that the
1976 Copyright Act does not specify the meaning of “an author”).
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mind” requirement on authorship.364 Judicial action to create a new
model of shared ownership among collaborating authors—and an attendant expanded understanding of the meaning of authorship for
purposes of earning a beneficial share of a copyright trust—falls
within the authority that courts already exercise.
Indeed, there are a number of cases indicating that our proposed
remedy is already within the scope of judicial powers. Perhaps the
outstanding example is provided by Rodrigue v. Rodrigue,365 where the
court dealt with a divorcing spouse’s claim to a share of ownership in
a copyrighted work. The court awarded the nonauthor spouse “an
undivided one-half interest in the net economic benefits generated by
or resulting from copyrighted works,” while awarding the author
spouse “continued entitlement to the exclusive control and management” of the works.366 Although the court based its decision on Louisiana community property law rather than general copyright law, it
clearly found the division of ownership interests between a legal and
beneficial owner to be within the scope of judicial powers permitted
by the Copyright Act.
Additionally, as we have noted, the Copyright Act already recognizes a concept of “beneficial ownership,” albeit for the limited purpose of establishing standing to sue.367 In short, there is little reason
to believe that our proposal is beyond judicial powers under the law.
D. An Incomplete Remedy
A final objection relates to the utility of our proposed doctrine.
Specifically, it might be argued that there may be cases where our
doctrine does not help resolve the tensions among collaborators. The
recent case of Garcia v. Google, Inc.368 may best illustrate the objection.
In Garcia, the plaintiff, an actress named Cindy Lee Garcia, sought to
enjoin the distribution of a controversial movie about the life of
Muhammad, the founder of Islam, on the grounds that she did not
consent to the inclusion of the relatively small part in which she appeared in the film.369 She asserted—and the court vindicated her
claim—that she owned a separate copyright in her performance that
allowed her to block any showings of the film that included her performance.370 Garcia’s motivation was not profit. She had received
death threats in relation to her performance in the film.371 In any
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371

Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000).
218 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 443.
Supra Part II.C.
766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’g on banc granted, 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 932.
Id. at 935.
Id. at 932.
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event, the film was apparently intended for limited distribution
through YouTube and would certainly never turn a profit.372 Thus, it
is evident that Garcia’s interests in blocking use of her performance in
the film could never be vindicated through a copyright trust.
We readily acknowledge that our proposed doctrine cannot provide a universal remedy for all potential disputes among collaborators
regarding copyrighted works. It is for this reason that we propose that
the copyright trust supplement, rather than replace, existing legal
remedies. The copyright trust can resolve the adverse effects created
by the unity of ownership and control when there are many contributors to a single work of authorship. The copyright trust cannot universally resolve every potential point of contention among collaborators.
At the same time, it is important not to exaggerate the importance of outlying cases like Garcia. In most cases, a copyright trust can
provide a good resolution of collaborator disputes. Garcia is a highly
unusual case; it is the exception that proves the rule. The facts of
Garcia reveal a truly anomalous situation where copyright law ended
up providing a legal remedy for a dispute that primarily concerned
speech issues unrelated to the core of copyright.
The film in controversy in Garcia, entitled The Innocence of Muslims, was not one intended for mass distribution or profit. The Innocence of Muslims was intended to be a highly inflammatory depiction of
Muhammad that would cast the religion of Islam in an uncomplimentary light.373 There is little doubt that the film’s producer intended to
create great offense and that he expected a strong negative reaction
to his film. Indeed, the film’s producer systematically misinformed
people about the film, apparently in order to avoid being personally
tied to the backlash he was certain would ensue.374 The producer lied
to actors and other participants about the nature of the film; he assured them it was a “desert adventure” and he had them read dialogue
for the “adventure” that he subsequently overdubbed.375 The producer lied about his identity to the media, attempting to mislead the
372
See Aly Weisman, The Insulting, Anti-Muslim, Low-Budget Film that Provoked the Attacks
on American Embassies, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 12, 2012, 11:21 AM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/heres-the-low-budget-american-film-that-was-being-protestedduring-the-libya-attacks-2012-9 (discussing many aspects of the film, including its inability,
and indeed lack of an intention, to raise money for profit).
373
Peter Rudegeair, I Have No Regrets for Portraying Mohammad as a Womanizer and
Pedophile: Innocence of Muslims Filmmaker, NAT’L POST (Nov. 26, 2012, 3:23 PM), http://
news.nationalpost.com/2012/11/26/i-have-no-regrets-for-portraying-mohammad-as-awomanizer-and-pedophile-innocence-of-muslims-filmmaker/.
374
Id.
375
Innocence of Muslims: How Bad? How Cheap? How Wrong?, WEEK (last updated Sept.
14, 2012, 4:37 PM), http://www.theweek.co.uk/middle-east/islam-film-row/49036/innocence-muslims-how-bad-how-cheap-how-wrong.
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public into believing the film had come from another source.376
Unsurprisingly, the film did produce a backlash. The film prompted
protests, many violent, in a number of Muslim countries.377 The
White House denounced the film,378 and the film’s producer was soon
arrested on the grounds that some aspects of his involvement violated
an earlier parole agreement.379 Several people associated with the
film were threatened with violence or death for the “negative portrayal of the Prophet.”380
There are numerous aspects of the film that raise difficult legal
questions. What bounds may the state place on speech that gravely
insults religious figures? May the state take into account the threat of
violence by adherents to the religion in defining those bounds?
Should private individuals have the right to curtail the speech of
others where third parties view the speech as motivation for acts of
violence? How should legal rights regarding such speech be altered
in the face of apparent fraud by someone who has organized the
speech of others? The answers to these questions are not obvious.
It should be noted, however, that none of these questions lie at
the core of copyright, which is a body of law that protects legal rights
in creative works in order to create pecuniary incentives for creation.381 Although Cindy Lee Garcia used the law of copyright to protect herself, she sought to vindicate interests that are rarely implicated
in copyright disputes. Indeed, the criticism382 that has been leveled
against the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Garcia has
seemingly proved, once again, that hard cases make bad law. The decision in Garcia was apparently motivated by the larger concerns raised
by the film, but the ruling cannot easily be reconciled with the extant
law of copyright.383 For the ordinary copyright case, copyright trusts
376

Id.
Liz Goodwin, ‘Innocence of Muslims’: The Film That May Have Sparked U.S. Embassy
Protests, YAHOO! NEWS (Sept. 12, 2012, 10:21 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/the-lookout/innocence-muslims-film-sparked-deadly-u-embassy-attacks-142118931.html.
378
Id.
379
Brooks Barnes, Man Behind Anti-Islam Video Gets Prison Term, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,
2012, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/maker-of-anti-islamvideo-gets-prison-term.html.
380
Court Orders Anti-Muslim Film Offline, AL JAZEERA AM. (Feb. 27, 2014, 1:39 AM),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/2/27/court-orders-takedownofantimuslim
video.html.
381
See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L.
REV. 1745 (2012) (asserting that this pecuniary reward for creativity is the very reason for
copyright at all).
382
See Clark D. Asay, Ex Post Incentives and IP in Garcia v. Google and Beyond, 67 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 37, 38 (2014); Jesse Woo, Garcia v. Google: Copyright Is Not Always the Answer, WASH. LAW. FOR ARTS BLOG (Apr. 18, 2014), http://thewla.org/garcia-v-google-copy
right-is-not-always-the-answer/ (providing another example of criticism).
383
Woo, supra note 382.
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should remain a valuable option for courts and a tool that reduces
disputes.
CONCLUSION
As expressive works become increasingly collaborative in nature,
the problem of allocating rights to a commonly produced work has
become paramount. We showed that the existing doctrines employed
by copyright law to address this challenge are inadequate for the task.
In its current form, copyright law simply does not provide the courts
with the tools they need to resolve disputes concerning right allocation and management in collaborative expressive works. Some of the
doctrines are too coarse, while others are too vague and malleable. As
we demonstrated, the lack of a precise legal mechanism has an adverse effect on the production and use of collaborative works. Furthermore, it consumes judicial resources that could have been put to
more productive uses.
In response to these problems, we developed a new ownership
model that is uniquely designed to address collaborative creative
works, termed “copyright trusts.” In our model, courts, when dealing
with collaborative works, would have the option of appointing one of
the contributors as an “owner-trustee,” who would have managerial
powers, and the other contributors as “owner-beneficiaries,” who
would be entitled to a predetermined share of the proceeds. To prevent abuse of power by the owner-trustee, she would owe a fiduciary
duty to the owner-beneficiaries. The proposed ownership structure
would concentrate all decision-making powers in the hands of a single
owner (the owner-trustee), whom the court considers best suited for
the task. At the same time, it would allow all other contributors (the
owner-beneficiaries) to receive financial remuneration for their labor.
Importantly, under our system the court will have the power to give
owner-beneficiaries different ownership stakes commensurate with
their contribution to the creative enterprise. Our model is therefore
capable of producing more efficient and more equitable outcomes
than current law.
Importantly, we do not wish to abrogate existing copyright doctrine and replace it with our proposal. Quite the contrary, our goal is
to add another tool to the toolkit of the courts and allow courts to use
it in appropriate cases. Analytically, ownership and control are two
distinct concepts. Yet, copyright law, in its current form, has elided
the two, vesting in copyright owners all the prerogatives of control.
Corporate law, by contrast, has kept the two separate. It is time that
copyright law departed from the old paradigm to find inspiration in
other legal domains.

